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"[T]he new federal government will ... be disinclined to invade the 
rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their governments." 1 
"[T]he Constitution of the United States ... recognizes and preserves 
the autonomy and independence of the States-independence in their 
legislative and independence in their judicial departments. . . . Any 
interference with either, except as [constitutionally] permitted, is an 
invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its 
independence. "2 
I. Introduction 
The understanding expressed by these opening quotes-that the national 
government was designed to be one of limited powers that would refrain from 
encroaching upon the sphere of authority reserved for the states-is at the core 
of the long ascendant legal doctrine of federalism.3 Familiar to all by now, 
modem-day federalism, generally, is a doctrine that takes constitutional limits 
on federal power seriously and demands respect for the sovereignty of states, 
protecting them against wayward impositions on their authority. Although the 
Constitution has several provisions enshrining federalism principles, the central 
I. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison). 
2. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938). 
3. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) ("In this relation, then, the proposed 
government cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain 
enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty 
over all other objects.") (emphasis added). 
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federalism passage in that document is the Tenth Amendment, which reads: 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people. "4 This clause and others reflecting federalism principles were 
reinvigorated by the Rehnquist Court, which was renowned for its active 
embrace of federalism. 5 The Court's federalist leanings under the late Chief 
Justice Rehnquist led it to invalidate federal action on several notable occasions 
on the ground that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority and 
intruded upon the sovereignty of the states.6 However, this "federalism 
revolution" as some would call it has not been confined to the courts. A core 
theme of Republican Party politics since Ronald Regan assumed the presidency 
has been the vigorous promotion of new federalism and states' rights. 7 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
5. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Book Review, 41 TRIAL 62, 62 (Feb. 2005) (reviewing 
THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY) ( "Rehnquist has helped 
move the Supreme Court in a more conservative direction, especially in reviving federalism as a 
limit on congressional and federal judicial power .. ..  "); Stephen G. Calabresi, Federalism and 
the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 24, 25 
(200 I) ( "Perhaps the most striking feature of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence has been the 
revival over the last 5-10 years of doctrines of constitutional federalism .... Not since before 
the New Deal-era constitutional revolution of 1937 have the states received such protection in 
the U.S. Supreme Court from allegedly burdensome federal statutes."). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (stating that Congress 
lacked the constitutional authority to enact 42 U.S.C. § 13981 under either the Commerce 
Clause or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) 
(stating that neither the Supremacy Clause nor any enumerated powers of Congress conferred 
authority to abrogate States' immunity as was allowed under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College 
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,647 (1999) (finding that the Patent Remedy Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 
296(a), could not abrogate a State's sovereign immunity); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
918 (1997) (declaring that interim provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921, 
violated the constitutional provision of dual sovereignty and separation of powers); City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,536 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., was unconstitutional as it applied to the states because 
it exceeded the power of Congress under§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 
U.S.C. § 922( q)( 1 )(A), because it was beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce 
Clause). 
7. See Ronald Regan, President's Inaugural Address, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 1, 2 (Jan. 20, 
1981) (speaking of his "intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and 
to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal Government 
and those reserved to the States or to the people."); see also CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE 
BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO 
CHANGE THE NATION 125-41 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas, eds. 1994) (explaining that the 
philosophy behind the Contract with America was one of devolution of power to the states). 
236 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233 (2007) 
Interestingly, in the midst of continued political rhetoric in support of 
federalism8 and the Court's stern rejection ofrecent congressional Commerce 
Clause legislation on federalism grounds, Congress has pursued legislation, and 
the Supreme Court has rendered decisions, that impose upon, supplant, or usurp 
the judicial authority of states and their courts.9 In a spate offederal tort reform 
efforts, Congress has variously sought to regulate state judicial procedure 
directly by limiting the award of punitive damages in state courts for state law 
claims, to require the application of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in state court proceedings, 10 and to determine intrastate venue in 
personal injury actions in state courts. 11 Meanwhile, the Court has expanded 
federal jurisdiction over state law claims through expansive preemption 
doctrines 12 and expansive interpretations of federal jurisdictional statutes, 13 
which has had the practical effect of depriving states of the ability to adjudicate 
claims arising under their own laws. Most alarmingly, both Congress and the 
Court have reached out to review and invalidate the final determinations of 
state courts on matters traditionally within their sphere of authority, vacating 
state court punitive damages awards as "excessive," 14 reversing the order of a 
recount deemed to be required under state law in a Presidential election, 15 and 
8. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at National 
Governors' Association Meeting (Feb. 26, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
200 l /02/20010226-8.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2006) ("The framers of the Constitution did not 
believe in an all-knowing, all-powerful federal government. They believed that our freedom is 
best preserved when power is dispersed. That is why they limited and enumerated the federal 
government's powers, and reserved the remaining functions of government to the states.") ( on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
9. See generally Anthony J. Bellia, Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 
YALE L.J. 947 (200 l )  (identifying this legislative and judicial trend). As Professor Bellia states: 
"Congress has turned its attention to regulating the state courts. In recent years, Congress has 
considered several bills, and enacted a few of them, seeking to regulate interstate commerce by 
regulating the way state courts conduct litigation." Id. at 950. Although Professor Bellia rightly 
noted that "[t]he next frontier of federalism is the relationship between Congress and the state 
courts," id. at 100 l ,  his critique of the trend was ultimately lukewarm and premature. Much has 
happened in this area since the time of Professor Bellia's article to suggest that the more strident 
critique and proposal put forth in this Article is due. 
IO. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 109th Cong.§ 3 (1st Sess. 2005). 
l 1. /J. § 4. 
12. See infra Parts II.A & II.C.2 ( discussing implied preemption of state law actions and 
the usurpation of state jurisdiction through removal under the complete preemption doctrine). 
13. See infra Parts II.C. l & II.C.3 ( explaining how the broad scope of federal question 
and supplemental jurisdiction has cabined the jurisdiction of state courts). 
14. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996); see infra Part II.D. l 
(discussing BMW in detail). 
15. Bush v. Gore, 53 l U.S. 98, l l l (2000); see infra Part II.D.2 (analyzing the 
overreaching of the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore). 
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authorizing federal district court review of a right-to-die dispute conclusively 
resolved by state courts. 16 
I refer to each of these federal efforts to control or usurp state court 
jurisdiction or procedure with respect to state law claims17 as anti-federalist18 
procedure. That is, anti-federalist procedure, as herein discussed, refers to 
federally-generated policies or doctrines that limit, control, or eliminate the 
ability of state courts to adjudicate state law claims in their courts or to devise 
and impose their own procedures for how such claims are litigated and 
resolved. Although the particular manifestations of anti-federalist procedure 
need not be illegitimate exercises of federal power, they often are. 
This Article will review some of the more notable instances of anti­
federalist procedure, offering a critique and proposing statutory and doctrinal 
revisions needed to put matters right. Part II presents specific examples of anti­
federalist procedure, offering some critique and analysis along the way. A full 
critique is reserved for Part III, wherein the Article details the significant 
constitutional difficulties with anti-federalist procedure. In Part IV, I present a 
vision of what federalism-respecting procedure would look like in the statutory 
and doctrinal areas discussed in Part II, ultimately recommending fairly drastic 
alterations of Supreme Court doctrines and a less radical statutory modification. 
16. See Reliefof the Parents ofTheresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 1, 119 Stat. 
15, 15 (2005) (granting the U.S. District Court for the Middle District ofFlorida jurisdiction to 
hear any claim brought by the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo regarding the provision oflife 
support); see also infra Part 11.D.3 (providing background on the Schiavo case and addressing 
the impropriety of this legislation). 
1 7. The extent to which Congress may regulate how state courts adjudicate federally­
created rights is a more settled matter beyond the scope of this article. Professor Bellia 
summarizes the law in that area as follows: 
Congress may require state courts to enforce federal claims if they are competent to 
do so; Congress may require state courts to enforce federal procedural rules that are 
"part and parcel" of a federal right of action; and Congress may, by implication, 
require state courts to follow federal procedural rules when application of a state 
procedural rule would unnecessarily burden a federal right. 
Bellia, supra note 9, at 962. 
18. The Anti-Federalists of the founding era were those who argued in favor of states' 
rights at the Constitutional Convention, while the Federalists defended the strengthened central 
government devised by the proposed Constitution, meaning that one could easily use the term 
"anti-federalist" to describe proponents of states' rights today. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, No 
Federalists Here: Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on the Rehnquist Court, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 
741, 741 (2000) (referring to the Court's defenders of state sovereignty as "Anti-Federalists"). 
However, in modern parlance federalists are those who subscribe to the new federalism that 
emphasizes limited federal government and a respect for state sovereignty. Thus, anti-federalist 
policies, as I describe them, are those that contravene these principles of the new federalism. 
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II. Anti-Federalist Procedure 
A. Implied Preemption of State Law Actions 
Perhaps the heartland of anti-federalist procedure is found within implied 
preemption doctrine. It is in the name of implied preemption that the Court has 
often found itself barring state law based claims that litigants have sought to 
assert. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. 19 provides a good example of this 
phenomenon. Petitioner Alexis Geier was seriously injured in an accident 
involving a 1987 Honda Accord she was driving. 20 Although her vehicle was 
equipped with manual shoulder and lap belts, which she was wearing, the 
vehicle was not outfitted with airbags.21 Geier sued American Honda Motor 
Company, the car's manufacturer, and its affiliates under District of Columbia 
tort law claiming negligent and defective design for failure to install airbags. 22 
At issue in the case was whether Geier' s suit was permitted in light of the 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (the Safety Act), which 
expressly preempted '" any safety standard' that is not identical to a federal 
safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance. "23 Because the 
applicable federal safety standard, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 
(FMVSS) 208, required auto manufacturers to equip some but not all of their 
1987 vehicles with passive restraints (which would include airbags), the district 
court concluded that Geier's lawsuit sought to establish a safety standard 
requiring airbags and thus would be a conflicting state standard that would be 
expressly preempted under the terms of the Act.24 On review, the Court of 
Appeals had its doubts about the district court's finding of express preemption 
in light of the Act's saving clause, 25 but reached the same result as the district 
court by reasoning that permitting the lawsuit would pose an obstacle to the 
objectives of FMVSS 208.26 After its review of the case, the Supreme Court 
19. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000) (stating that petitioner's 
claim was preempted even though the Act at issue did not expressly preempt a state law based 
suit). 
20. Id. at 865. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. (quoting 15 U. S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. 
(2000))). 
24. Geier, 529 U.S. at 865. 
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (2000)) 
(" Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does 
not exempt any person from any liability under common law."). 
26. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3d 1236, 1238--43 (D. C. Cir. 1999), cert 
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reached the same result, holding that although the Safety Act did not expressly 
preempt state law based suits challenging the failure to install airbags, such 
suits actually conflicted with the objectives of FMVSS 208.27 
Justice Stevens, writing for a four-Justice minority, dissented in Geier.28 
Finding no conflict between FMVSS 208 and the instant state tort suit, Justice 
Stevens wrote: 
It is . . . clear to me that the objectives that the Secretary intended to 
achieve through the adoption of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 
208 would not be frustrated one whit by allowing state courts to determine 
whether in 1987 the lifesaving advantages of airbags had become 
sufficiently obvious that their omission might constitute a design defect in 
some new cars.29 
Also of central importance to Justice Stevens was the Safety Act's saving 
clause, which provided: "Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety 
standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any 
liability under common law. 1130 In Justice Stevens' s view, this clause not only 
expressly preserved state common law remedies but it also "arguably denie[d] 
the Secretary [ of Transportation] the authority to promulgate standards that 
would pre-empt common-law remedies."3 1  Given the presence of the savings 
clause and the silence of FMVSS 208 with respect to its own preemptive force, 
Justice Stevens felt that the historical presumption against preemption had not 
been overcome.32 
What we have in Geier then is the Court acknowledging that no express 
preemption is achieved by the statute but nonetheless implying preemption 
based on its own judgment regarding the conflict between the objectives of the 
Secretary of Transportation and the allowance of the type of state law claims at 
issue in that case. But given the Court's own conclusion that Congress had not 
expressly preempted state common law actions, plus the presence of a saving 
clause, such a determination by the Court was unwarranted. As Justice Stevens 
remarked in Geier, "the Supremacy Clause does not give unelected federal 
granted, 527 U.S. 1063 ( 1999), ajf'd, 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
27 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 ,  866 (2000). 
28. Id. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined in 
the opinion. 
29. Id. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 397(k) ( 1988). 
3 1 .  Geier, 529 U.S. at 899-900 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
32. See id. at 905--06 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is evident that Honda has not crossed 
the high threshold established by our decisions regarding pre-emption of state laws that 
allegedly frustrate federal purposes."). 
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judges carte blanche to use federal law as a means of imposing their own ideas 
of tort reform on the States. "33 Respect for the constitutional role of the states 
as sovereign entities demands that states be ousted of their traditional 
jurisdiction over common law tort actions only upon the clearest expression of 
congressional intent or where simultaneous compliance with federal and state 
law is impossible. The problems with the implied preemption doctrine will be 
discussed in greater detail in Part III. 
B. Federally-Imposed Litigation Reform 
Since 1994 when Republicans took over control of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, litigation reform (more commonly referred to as "tort reform") 
has been a congressional priority.34 In their "Contract with America" one of the 
first things Republican Members of Congress pledged to do once they gained 
majority control was to introduce the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 
1995, which in their words would consist of '"Loser pays' laws, reasonable 
limits on punitive damages and reform of product liability laws to stem the 
endless tide oflitigation. "35 In addition to these measures, one finds in the text 
of the proposed bill attached to the Contract with America a separate measure 
entitled the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 36 The 
PSLRA ultimately became law,37 as have several other significant reform 
measures at least nominally intended to improve what proponents see as a 
broken and abused litigation system. 
Because state judicial proceedings represent the lion's share oflitigation 
activity in this country, in order to have any hopes of achieving their objectives 
of widespread litigation reform, lawmakers have had to target their reforms not 
only at the federal system, but at state judicial systems as well. Given the 
separate sovereignty of states and their unquestioned authority to adjudicate 
state law claims falling within their traditional sphere of control, any federal 
33. Id. at 894. 
34 The changeover in Congress to thin Democratic control after the 2006 mid-term 
elections will likely spell the end to this focus. 
35. CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 7, at 11 (providing a more detailed version of the 
Republicans' Contract with America than what is found online). 
36. H.R. I 058, 104th Cong. (1995), available at http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/ 
Legalrefb.txt. 
37. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of l 995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995). 
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effort to direct, limit, or eliminate state court jurisdiction would necessarily 
be anti-federalist in nature. That is, modem federalism principles ordinarily 
call for a respect of "dual sovereignty"38 and are wary of infringing on the 
legitimate authority of states. This section considers several examples of 
congressional measures-some enacted and others not-that in some way 
have sought to control or eliminate the ability of state courts to adjudicate or 
provide remedies for state law claims in the name of achieving nationwide 
litigation reform. 
J. A ttempts to Limit State-Imposed Punitive Damages 
Throughout the late 1990s congressional Republicans pursued attempts 
to limit punitive damages awards in the products liability area. The first 
litigation reform measure introduced by the House majority after taking 
control from the Democrats was the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 
1995 .39 Most of the bill proposed changes that only would have applied to 
federal civil litigation. However, section 103 of the bill, entitled "Product 
Liability Reform," contained product liability rules applicable to product 
sellers and preempted state laws to the extent such laws covered the same 
issues comprehended by the proposed liability rules.40 In addition to these 
substantive legal rules, the bill also included punitive damages caps for 
products liability actions-the greater of"3 times the amount awarded to the 
claimant for the economic injury on which such claim is based, or 
$250,000."41  This provision of the bill expressly would have covered "any 
product liability action brought in any State or Federal Court against any 
manufacturer or seller of a product on any theory for harm caused by the 
product" and thus would have told states that their courts could not impose 
punitive damages awards in amounts deemed appropriate. 
The bill did not make it out of the House of Representatives. However, 
another attempt to limit the level of punitive damages that state courts could 
impose, the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, 
soon followed.42 It passed both houses of Congress but was blocked by 
38. Printz v. United States, 52 1 U.S. 898, 9 18  ( 1997) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 457 ( 1 991 )). 
39. H.R. 1 0, 1 04th Cong. ( 1 st Sess. 1 995). 
40. Id. § 103. 
41. Id. 
42. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1 996). 
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President Clinton's veto.43 This legislation would have imposed stricter 
punitive damages caps than its predecessor-twice the level of compensatory 
damages or $250,000-and also would have required claimants to 
"establish[] by clear and convincing evidence that conduct carried out by the 
defendant with a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of 
others was the proximate cause of the harm that is the subject of the action in 
any product liability action. "44 The bill contained an "Exception for 
Insufficient Award in Cases of Egregious Conduct"45 that empowered judges 
to disregard these caps if-after the consideration of eight factors spelled out 
in the proposed statute-the judge determined that the limited award would 
be "insufficient to punish the egregious conduct of the defendant. "46 
In the wake of President Clinton's veto, Senate Republicans tried their 
hand at products liability reform the following year by introducing the 
Product Liability Reform Act of 1997.47 Citing a concern that excessive 
punitive damages "penalties are harmful to business and to consumers of 
products when price reflects the risk of such penalties, "48 section 108 of the 
bill (entitled "Uniform Standards for Award of Punitive Damages") included 
a "clear and convincing evidence" standard49 similar to the failed bill of the 
prior Congress. The bill expressly preempted state law and declared its 
applicability to "any product liability action brought in any State or Federal 
court on any theory for harm caused by a product. 1150 By mandating the 
standard of proof necessary to support an award of punitive damages, this 
legislation would have limited the ability of states to punish tortf easors and 
undermined states' own punitive damages policies. However, this bill never 
made it out of the Senate, although a substantially similar version of the bill 
was reintroduced in 1 998, with similar results. 5 1  
43. See THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ON THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ 
z?dl 04:HR00956:@@@ S (last visited Dec. 4, 2006) (providing the full history of the Common 
Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1 996) ( on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
44. H.R. REP. No. 104-481 § 1 08(a) (1996) (accompanying H.R. 956). 
45. Id.§ 108(b)(3). 
46. Id. § 108(b)(3)(A). 
47. S. 648, 105th Cong. ( 1997). 
48. S. REP. No. 105-32, at 6 ( 1997) (quoting William Fry, Executive Director of HALT, in 
his testimony before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism, 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Apr. 3, 1995). 
49. S. 648, 105th Cong.§ 108(a) (1997). 
50. Id. § 102(a)( l ). 
51. See S. 2236, 105th Cong. ( 1 998) (proposing "to establish legal standards and 
procedures for products liability litigation and for other purposes "). 
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2. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards A ct 
Republicans were much more successful in their efforts at reforming 
litigation in the securities fraud area. The 104th Congress enacted ( over 
another Presidential veto) the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (PSLRA), which-most importantly-imposed heightened pleading 
requirements for asserting securities fraud claims.52 Because the statute only 
applied to claims pursued in federal court, Congress quickly found that 
litigants were migrating covered claims to state courts in order to avoid the 
strictures of the PSLRA.53 In response to this perceived migration, Congress 
enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), 
the express goal of which was to prevent litigants from circumventing and 
thereby undermining the purposes of the PSLRA.54 To achieve this goal, 
SLUSA preempts covered securities class actions, pertaining to the "purchase 
or sale" of certain securities, brought in state court under state law and makes 
them removable to federal court.55 Further, SLUSA directs that preemption 
52. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 2 1D(b)(2), 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at 1 5  U.S.C. 
§ 78u-4(b )(2) (2000)) (stating that in a private action for money damages the plaintiff must 
prove the defendant acted with the required intent); see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 
U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (describing the Act as imposing, beginning in 1 995, stricter pleading 
requirements in private securities fraud actions that, among other things, require that a 
complaint "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required [fraudulent] state of mind"). 
53. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. I 05-353 § 2(2), 
1 12 Stat. 3227 ("[S]ince enactment of[the PSLRA], considerable evidence has been presented 
to Congress that a number of securities class action lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State 
courts."). 
54. See id. § 2(5) ("[I]n order to prevent certain State private securities class action 
lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, it is appropriate to enact national standards for securities class 
action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities . . . .  "); see also Kircher v. Putnam Funds 
Trust, 403 F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 2005) ("SLUSA is designed to prevent plaintiffs from 
migrating to state court in order to evade rules for federal securities litigation in the [PSLRA]."), 
vacated, 1 26 S. Ct. 2 145 (2006). 
55. See Erb v. Alliance Capital Mgmt, 423 F.3d 647, 648 (7th Cir. 2005) (addressing a 
class-action, breach-of-contract claim against a mutual fund manager for buying poorly rated 
securities). The Seventh Circuit explained that: 
SLUSA preempts a claim only ifit: (i) is brought by a private party; (ii) is brought 
as a covered class action; (iii) is based on state law; (iv) alleges that the defendant 
misrepresented or omitted a material fact (or employed a manipulative device or 
contrivance); and (v) asserts that defendant did so in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a covered security. 
Id. at 65 1 (citing Disher v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 4 19  F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
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decisions respecting covered actions must be made by federal judges rather 
than state courts.56 
The effect of this legislation on state court jurisdiction is twofold. First, 
state courts are no longer able to retain jurisdiction over state law claims they 
otherwise would have a right to hear. Second, state courts are not permitted 
to make the preemption determination themselves but must yield the case so 
that federal judges can decide the issue. There may be sound federal policy 
reasons for both of these aspects of SLUSA. Congress has a right to pursue a 
uniform federal policy in the area of securities regulation and thus, permitting 
state court actions in this field can plausibly be seen to be a threat to that 
objective. Requiring that federal judges make the preemption determination 
could be seen as a way to ensure the quality and consistency of such 
decisions-things that would be important to maintaining the integrity of the 
SLUSA regime. However, it is worth noting that vesting federal courts with 
this responsibility has not led to complete uniformity in how courts view the 
scope ofSLUSA's preemptive effect. For example, the circuits were divided 
over whether claims related solely to the retention of securities, as opposed to 
their purchase or sale, are preempted by SLUSA57 until the split was recently 
resolved by the Supreme Court. 58 In any event, though legitimate rationales 
can be proffered in support of SLUSA's measures affecting state court 
jurisdiction, it remains the case that Congress chose to strip state courts of 
their authority to provide remedies for persons asserting various state law 
claims and of their concurrent jurisdiction over preemption determinations, 
making SLUSA anti-federalist in tenor. 
56. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, tit. 1, sec. I OI(a)( l ), § 16(d)(4) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77p) ("[I]f the Federal court determines that the action may 
be maintained in State court pursuant to this subsection, the Federal court shall remand such 
action to such State court."). 
57. Compare Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 43 (2d 
Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006) ("[I]n enacting SLUSA Congress sought only to 
ensure that class actions brought by plaintiffs who satisfy the Blue Chip purchaser-seller rule are 
subject to the federal securities laws."), with Disher v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 419 F.3d 
649, 655 (7th Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2964 (2006) (holding that SLUSA preempted an 
action even though the investor's complaint referred only to the holding of stocks, not to their 
'purchase or sale."'). 
58. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1514-15 
(2006) (holding that SLUSA preempts state law class actions alleging that misrepresentations or 
omissions induced class members to retain or delay selling covered securities). 
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3. Class A ction Fairness A ct 
Much has been written on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(CAFA)59 and thus little more needs to be said here.60 Professor Morrison 
summed up CAF A nicely when he wrote, "Its main thrust is procedural: it 
would permit defendants to remove from state to federal court most damages 
class actions, in particular those cases based on state law, which currently can 
only be litigated in state court. "61  CAF A does this by expanding diversity 
jurisdiction to cover class actions of 100 or more class members whose claims 
aggregate to greater than $5,000,00062 and by eliminating various barriers to 
the removal of such cases to federal court. 63 As with previous federal litigation 
reform measures, CAF A was enacted in response to a perception that lawyers 
were abusing class actions. Specifically, the Senate Judiciary committee 
indicated that CAFA was needed to combat the ability of lawyers to " 'game' 
the procedural rules and keep nationwide or multi-state class actions in state 
courts whose judges have reputations for readily certifying classes and 
approving settlements . . . .  "64 Ultimately, Congress was not satisfied with the 
outcomes of class actions heard in state courts, particularly in certain "magnet 
courts" known for their favorable pro-plaintiff bent, and felt that state judges 
were simply too lax in their scrutiny of proposed class actions. 65 Here again, 
59. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1 09-2, 1 19 Stat. 4 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 7 1 1-1 5, 1453 (2000)). 
60. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way 
to Handle the Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1 52 1 ,  1 535-42 (2005) 
(discussing the procedural implications of the Class Action Fairness Act of2005 which permits 
defendants to remove from state to federal court most class actions-in particular, cases based 
on state law which until this point could only be litigated in state court). 
61 .  Id. at 1 522. 
62. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 1 09-2, § 4(a)(2), 1 10 Stat. 4, 9-12  
( amending 28  U.S.C. § 1332, which outlines provisions for  federal district court jurisdiction of 
interstate class actions). 
63. See id. § 5(b) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1 453) (setting provisions for the 
removal of interstate class actions to federal district court). The statute states: 
Id. 
A class action may be removed to a district court of the United States in accordance 
with section 1 446 ( except that the I -year limitation under section l 446(b) shall not 
apply), without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which 
the action is brought, except that such action may be removed by any defendant 
without the consent of all defendants. 
64. S. REP. No. 1 09-1 4, at 4 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5. 
Additionally, the report states: "This Committee believes that the current diversity and removal 
standards as applied in interstate class actions have facilitated a parade of abuses." Id. at 6. 
65. See id. at 1 4  ("[S]ome state court judges are less careful than their federal court 
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we find Congress indulging its anti-federalist impulses to impose on the judicial 
authority of states based on its dissatisfaction with the results that state courts 
were producing when they adjudicated state law claims over which they 
properly had jurisdiction. 
4. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act 
This past Congress considered legislation entitled the Lawsuit Abuse 
Reduction Act (LARA),66 a bill that sought to enhance attorney accountability 
by strengthening the available sanctions regimes in both federal and state 
courts. Specifically, LARA would have amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure to make the impositions of sanctions mandatory upon a 
finding of a violation, added compensation as an express objective of sanctions 
in addition to deterrence, and eliminated the safe harbor that prevents litigants 
from going directly to the court with their Rule 11 allegations until they have 
given their opponent the opportunity to withdraw the offending filing.67 LARA 
would also, among other things, have mandated a one-year suspension for 
attorneys found to have violated Rule 11 three or more times. 68 More important 
for our purposes are the various anti-federalist aspects of the bill. First, the bill 
would have made Rule 1 1  applicable in state court proceedings where the judge 
determines that "the action substantially affects interstate commerce. "69 
Second, LARA purported to determine venue for personal injury actions 
brought in state courts, limiting proper venue to those states-and to those 
counties within those states-where the claimant resides now or at the time of 
the injury, where the claimant was injured, where the defendant resides, or 
where the defendant's principal place of business is located.70 Notably, this 
provision of the bill did not limit control over intrastate venue to cases affecting 
interstate commerce. Finally, the bill prevented courts from ordering the 
concealment of unlawful conduct in the context of Rule 11  proceedings,71 a 
provision that presumably would apply to state courts in instances where 
LARA declared Rule 11 to apply.72 
counterparts about applying the procedural requirements that govern class actions."). 
66. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 109th Cong. ( 1 st Sess. 2005). 
67. Id. § 2. 
68. Id §  6. 
69. Id § 3. 
70. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 109th Cong.§ 9 ( 1 st Sess. 2005). 
71 .  Id. § 9. 
72. See id. § 3 ( stating standards for determining the applicability of Rule 1 1  to state cases 
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The patent anti-federalist aspects of this legislation likely explain why 
LARA failed to become law during the I 09th Congress. 73 It is doubtful that 
Congress has the authority to require state judges to apply the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in their courts simply because the action would impact 
interstate commerce. More dubious still is the notion that Congress can lay 
venue for personal injury actions brought in state courts, particularly in the 
absence of any connection to matters affecting interstate commerce. A full 
critique of all of these congressional efforts will occur in Part II, but it is worth 
mentioning here the thread that connects each of them: When Congress has 
disapproved of the results that state courts produce when adjudicating state law 
claims, it has sought to usurp state judicial authority either by constraining the 
discretion of state judges and juries directly or by taking cases away from them 
entirely. 
C. Usurpation of State Jurisdiction 
Federal efforts to interfere with state court authority over state law claims 
have not been limited to the area oflitigation reform, nor have such efforts been 
exclusively at the hands of Congress. The Supreme Court has made a 
substantial contribution to anti-federalist usurpations of state judicial authority 
through its broad interpretation of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Just as 
the complete diversity requirement74 and the well-pleaded complaint rule75 have 
affecting interstate commerce). 
73. See THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ON THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bd 
query/z?d l 09:HR00420:@@@X (last visited Dec. 4, 2006) (providing the full history ofH.R. 
420) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Although the House approved the 
measure last fall, the Senate has taken no further action on the bill. Id. In light of the change in 
party control of both houses of Congress after the 2006 midterm elections, it is unlikely that 
LARA will be taken up in the l l 0th Congress. 
74. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 ( l  806) (holding that in a case 
with multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants, the presence in the action of a single plaintiff 
from the same State as a single defendant deprives the district court of original diversity 
jurisdiction over the entire action). 
75. The Court in Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 ( 1914) noted: 
[W]hether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or treaty of the 
United States, in the sense of the jurisdictional statute[,] . . .  must be determined 
from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the 
bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of 
defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose. 
See also Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. l ,  
9-l O ( l  983) (stating that under the well-pleaded complaint rule a defendant may not remove a 
case to federal court where there is no diversity of citizenship unless the plaintiff's complaint 
248 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233 (2007) 
limited the scope of federal jurisdiction, certain of the Court's decisions 
regarding the scope of federal question jurisdiction, removal jurisdiction, and 
supplemental jurisdiction have gone in the other direction. At each tum, the 
Court has interpreted the relevant statutes broadly in ways that unduly impose 
on the ability of state courts to retain cases traditionally within their 
jurisdiction. This subpart reviews the Court's decisions in these areas. 
I .  Expansive Federal Question Jurisdiction 
The original jurisdiction of federal district courts extends to "all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."76 
In addition to conferring jurisdiction over claims pleading causes of action 
created by federal law, the Court has long interpreted the federal question 
statute to grant jurisdiction over state law claims when "it appears that some 
substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of 
the well-pleaded state claims."77 In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Thompson, 78 the Court explained that the existence of a "substantial, disputed" 
federal issue would not suffice to confer federal question jurisdiction over state 
law actions when Congress has precluded federal private remedies for the 
federal statute at issue. 79 
However, recently in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue 
Engineering & Manufacturing, 80 the Court definitively rejected the idea that the 
absence of a federal private right of action in federal statutes implicated in state 
law claims precluded federal jurisdiction over those claims. 81 The Court recast 
Merrell Dow as a decision not fixated on whether Congress had provided for a 
private right of action but rather as a decision that "treat[ ed] the absence of a 
federal private right of action as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the 
establishes federal question jurisdiction without regard to defenses implicating federal law). 
Id. 
76. 28 u.s.c. § 1331 (2000). 
77. Franchise Tax Bd, 463 U. S. at 1 3. 
78. Merrell Dow Pharrn., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
79. Id. at 8 14. As the Court states: 
We simply conclude that the congressional determination that there should be no 
federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a 
congressional conclusion that the presence ofa claimed violation of the statute as 
an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently "substantial" to confer federal­
question jurisdiction. 
80. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
81. Id.at 318- 19. 
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'sensitive judgments about congressional intent' that § 1331 requires. "82 In 
Merrell Dow, said the Grable & Sons Court, a conclusion that federal 
jurisdiction was available for state law claims based on violations offederal law 
would have undermined Congress's determination that there be no federal 
private right of action for such violations and would have flooded the federal 
courts with an enormous amount of cases. 83 However, in Grable & Sons the 
Court said there was no such threat. Grable & Sons involved a state quiet title 
action in which the claimant asserted superior title based on a claimed 
deficiency in the notice given by the Internal Revenue Service when it seized 
and sold Grable's property.84 Because "it is the rare state quiet title action that 
involves contested issues of federal law," said the Court, "jurisdiction over 
actions like Grable's would not materially affect, or threaten to affect, the 
normal currents of litigation. "85 Based on this finding, the Court concluded, 
Given the absence of threatening structural consequences and the clear 
interest the Government, its buyers, and its delinquents have in the 
availability of a federal forum, there is no good reason to shirk from federal 
jurisdiction over the dispositive and contested federal issue at the heart of 
the state-law title claim."86 
Ultimately, Grable & Sons backtracks substantially from the position set 
forth in Me"ell Dow. The Me"el/ Dow Court said unequivocally, "the 
congressional determination that there should be no federal remedy for the 
violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that 
the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause 
of action is insufficiently 'substantial' to confer federal-question jurisdiction. "87 
After Grable & Sons, that is no longer the case. Rather, such a congressional 
82. Id. at 3 1 8  (quoting Me"ell Dow Pharm., Inc., 478 U.S. at 8 1 0). 
83. See id. at 3 1 9  ("A general rule of exercising federal jurisdiction over state claims 
resting on federal mislabeling and other statutory violations would thus have heralded a 
potentially enormous shift of traditionally state cases into federal courts."). 
84. Id. at 3 1 0-1 1 .  
85. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 3 1 9. 
86. Id. at 3 1 9-20. The Court has subsequently indicated that the propriety of federal 
jurisdiction in Grable & Sons was buttressed by the fact that the case "presented a nearly 'pure 
issue oflaw,' one 'that could be settled once and for all and thereafter would govern numerous 
tax sale cases."' Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2 12 1 ,  2 137  (2006) 
(quoting R. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 65 (2005 Supp.)). The McVeigh Court also highlighted the fact that Grab/e's finding of 
federal jurisdiction was in the context of a "dispute . . .  centered on the action of a federal 
agency (IRS) and its compatibility with a federal statute," 126 S. Ct. at 2 1 37, a potential 
circumstance that may provide some basis for limiting the breadth and impact of the Grable 
decision going forward. 
87. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 ( l986) (emphasis added). 
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determination is merely one factor to be considered as part of the Court's 
determination of whether permitting federal jurisdiction would be contrary to 
"congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and 
federal courts. "88 According to the Grable & Sons Court, if federal jurisdiction 
over state law claims implicating a particular federal statute appears likely not 
to impact a significant number of cases, then Congress's failure to provide for a 
private right of action is relegated to congressional "ambivalence" on the matter 
that permits the Court to declare itself that "there is no good reason to shirk 
from federal jurisdiction. 1189 
This, needless to say, is nonsense. Federal question jurisdiction cannot 
depend on the Court's own estimation of the volume of state law claims that 
would be moved to federal court in the event that federal jurisdiction were 
permitted. Federal jurisdiction either is conferred by the statute or it is not. 
Further, if congressional intent is supposed to be the indicium of the 
permissibility of jurisdiction under § 1331, then certainly the Court should treat 
absence of a private right of action as Congress's expression of an intent that 
violations of the statute not be litigated in federal courts. 
Most importantly, however, are the anti-federalist attributes of the Court's 
new approach to federal question jurisdiction. It is axiomatic that "Federal 
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power 
authorized by Constitution and statute, . . . which is not to be expanded by 
judicial decree. 1190 When Congress enacts a statute without making a private 
right of action available but the Court nevertheless declares that state law 
claims implicating or raising issues respecting those statutes are indeed 
cognizable in federal courts, the Court, not Congress, is conferring jurisdiction 
over such matters by its own decree. By expanding the jurisdiction of federal 
courts over these state law claims in the absence of a true congressional grant of 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has empowered federal courts to hear cases 
they have no constitutional authority to hear, robbing state courts of jurisdiction 
over these claims in the process. Unfortunately, in Grable & Sons, the Court 
made no mention of a state's sovereign interest in exercising its judicial 
authority within its legitimate sphere in its discussion of the considerations 
relevant to determining whether federal arising under jurisdiction is available. 
If states' sovereign authority to adjudicate disputes involving their own laws 
had been truly respected, the Supreme Court would have required that Congress 
88. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 3 1 3-14 
(2005). 
89. Id at 3 1 9-20. 
90. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 5 1 1  U.S. 375, 377 ( 1994). 
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speak clearly if it intended to permit federal courts to rob states of their own 
claims based on imbedded federal issues. 
2. Removal Under the Complete Preemption Doctrine 
The federal removal statute permits civil actions "arising under" federal 
law to be removed from state court to federal court.91 Ordinarily, the Court 
evaluates the removability of actions based on the well-pleaded complaint rule: 
[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only 
when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is 
based upon those laws or that Constitution. It is not enough that the 
plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action, and asserts 
that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the 
United States.92 
Pursuant to the well-pleaded complaint rule, "federal jurisdiction exists only 
when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly 
pleaded complaint"93 and thus actions are not removable simply because the 
defendant raises a defense based on federal law.94 The rule that federal 
defenses fail to confer federal jurisdiction applies even when the federal 
defense is one asserting that federal law preempts the state law action in some 
way.95 
In Avco Corp. v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers,96 the Supreme Court created an exception to the well-pleaded 
complaint rule for cases where the Court determines that a federal cause of 
action completely preempts a state cause of action. 97 The Court later explained 
the Avco rule as follows: 
The necessary ground of decision was that the preemptive force of § 30 I 
[the portion of the federal statute at issue in Avco] is so powerful as to 
displace entirely any state cause of action "for violation of contracts 
91. 28 u.s.c. § 1441(b) (2000). 
92. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). 
93. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U. S. 386, 392 (1987). 
94. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. I, 9-
10 (1983) (requiring under the well-pleaded complaint rule that the complaint establish federal 
question jurisdiction). 
95. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 ("[A] case may not be removed to federal court on the basis 
of . .. the defense of pre-emption .... ") (emphasis omitted). 
96. Avco Corp. v. Int'! Assoc. of Machinist & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557 ( 1968). 
97. See id at 559-60 (finding that federal interpretation of federal law will govern in cases 
arising under the Labor Management Relations Act even though the action is brought in state court). 
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between an employer and a labor organization." Any such suit is purely a 
creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would 
provide a cause of action in the absence of § 30 1 . Avco stands for the 
proposition that if a federal cause of action completely preempts a state 
cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal 
cause of action necessarily "arises under" federal law.98 
Thus, this exception, which has come to be known as the complete preemption 
doctrine, applies when federal law displaces entirely a state action falling 
within the scope of the cause of action made available under the federal law 
because, in the Court's words, the state law claim "necessarily 'arises under' 
federal law. "99 
The Court applied the complete preemption doctrine to usurp state court 
jurisdiction not too long ago in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson.100 In 
Beneficial National Bank, a group of borrowers brought an action in Alabama 
state court against Beneficial for charging excessive interest in violation of 
Alabama's common law usury doctrine and an Alabama usury statute. 101 
Beneficial removed the action to Alabama federal court, arguing that the 
National Bank Act 102 exclusively governed the rate of interest that a national 
bank may lawfully charge and provided the exclusive remedies available 
against a national bank charging excessive interest, thus making the action 
removable under the removal statute and the complete preemption doctrine. 103 
The district court agreed with Beneficial' s position but a panel of the Eleventh 
Circuit disagreed on the ground that the relevant provisions of the National 
Bank Act disclosed no congressional intent to permit removal of state law 
claims preempted by the Act. 104 The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh 
Circuit, finding the claims to be removable based on complete preemption. 105 
The Court reasoned that because the National Bank Act provides the exclusive 
cause of action for usury claims against national banks "there is, in short, no 
98. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 463 U.S. at 23-24. 
99. Id. at 24. 
1 00. Beneficial Nat'I Banlc v. Anderson, 539 U.S. I (2004). 
IO I .  Id. at 3-4. 
1 02. National Banlc Act, 1 2  U. S.C. §§ 85-86 (2000). 
1 03. See Beneficial Nat '/ Bank, 539 U. S. at 4-5 (discussing 28 U. S.C. § 1441). 
1 04. See Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d 1 038, 1 048 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2002), rev 'd, 539 
U.S. I (2004) (finding no clear congressional intent to permit removal under§§ 85-86 of the 
National Banlc Act). 
1 05. See Beneficial Nat '/ Bank, 539 U. S. at 1 1  ("In actions against national banks for 
usury, [the National Banlc Act] supersede[s] both the substantive and the remedial provisions of 
state usury laws and create[ s] a federal remedy for overcharges that is exclusive, even when the 
state complaint ... relies entirely on state law."). 
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such thing as a state law claim of usury against a national bank" and thus "[t]his 
cause of action against national banks only arises under federal law and could, 
therefore, be removed under § 1441.11 106 
Unfortunately, the Court in Beneficial National Bank provided no more 
explanation of this incomprehensible doctrine than it had given on previous 
occasions. Although the Court rightly noted that the fact that the National 
Bank Act provides defendants with a complete federal preemption defense 
"would not justify removal," the Court felt that the preemptive effect was so 
absolute and complete so as to give the statute "the requisite pre-emptive force 
to provide removal jurisdiction." 107 Of course, this is not an explanation but 
simply the Court's own ipse dixit, in effect declaring that because the Bank Act 
is really preemptive, preempted state law claims magically turn into removable 
federal claims. In his dissent in Beneficial National Bank, Justice Scalia 
properly labeled this hocus pocus as "jurisdictional alchemy" that the Court has 
never adequately explained or justified. 108 Just because federal law may 
preempt a state law claim does not somehow transform the state claim into a 
federal one. 109 Rather, the claim is merely a state law claim that is preempted. 
Thus, the proper approach in such instances would be to require 
defendants to raise their preemption defenses in the state courts in which the 
state law claims were brought and permit those state courts to resolve them. 
Then, as the United States explained in its amicus brief in Beneficial National 
Bank, the state court could either recharacterize the preempted state law claim 
as federal, dismiss the claim on preemption grounds, or reject the preemption 
defense and find that the state law claim was not preempted. 1 10 In the event of 
an erroneous preemption determination, the U.S. Supreme Court would remain 
available to review the decision through its certiorari jurisdiction.1 1 1  By not 
106. Id. at l l .  
107. Id. 
l 08. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that the majority's view has "scant support in 
our precedents and no support whatever in the National Bank Act or any Act of Congress"). 
1 09. See id. at 18-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[E]ven if the Court is correct that the 
National Bank Act obliterates entirely any state-created right to relief for usury against a 
national bank, that does not explain how or why the claim of such a right is transmogrified into 
the claim of a federal right."). 
1 1 0. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17-18, Beneficial 
Nat'! Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-306), 2003 WL 1 098993. 
1 1 1 . See 28 U.S.C. § 1 257 (2000) (granting the U.S. Supreme Court the power to review 
judgments of the States' highest courts); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust 
of S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 ,  1 2  n. 1 2  ( 1983) ("[T)he absence of original jurisdiction does not mean 
that there is no federal forum in which a pre-emption defense may be heard. If the state courts 
reject a claim offederal pre-emption, that decision may ultimately be reviewed on appeal by this 
Court."). 
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taking this course, the Court usurped the legitimate jurisdiction of state courts 
and worked "an expansion of federal jurisdiction [that] wrest[s] from state 
courts the authority to decide questions of pre-emption." 1 12 Therein lies the 
aspect of the complete preemption doctrine that makes it a manifestation of 
anti-federalist procedure: Through complete preemption the Court denies states 
the right to hear state law claims in their courts, based not on any express 
determination by Congress that such claims are removable to federal court, but 
based solely on the Court's fanciful determination that these claims are in 
reality not state law claims at all. But unless Congress makes that so through 
its legislative authority, the Court cannot simply declare it to be so by judicial 
fiat. 1 13 
3. Expansive Supplemental Jurisdiction 
Congress has provided for "supplemental jurisdiction" over claims that by 
themselves would not enjoy federal jurisdiction but form part of the same case 
or controversy as claims that do qualify for federal jurisdiction asserted in the 
same action. Supplemental jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1 367, 
which has two main parts. Section l 367(a) contains the grant of supplemental 
jurisdiction by stating, inter a/ia: 
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, 
the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims 
that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 
that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 
United States Constitution. 1 14 
Section 1 367(b) then outlines the instances where supplemental jurisdiction is 
unavailable: 
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction 
founded solely on section 1 332 of this title, the district courts shall not have 
supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs 
against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined 
as plaintiffs under Rule 19  of such rules, or seeking to intervene as 
plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental 
112. Beneficial Nat'! Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. l ,  19 (2004) ( Scalia, J., dissenting). 
113. See id. at 2 1  ( Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is up to Congress, not the federal courts, to 
decide when the risk of state-court error with respect to a matter of federal law becomes so 
unbearable as to justify divesting the state courts of authority to decide the federal matter."). 
l 14. 28 U.S. C. § 1367(a) (2000). 
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jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional 
requirements of section 1332. 1 15 
255 
Absent from this language is any reference to Rule 23, the rule that 
permits parties to sue or be sued as a class. 1 16 Nor does the provision refer to 
Rule 20, which permits parties to sue or be sued jointly within a single 
action. 1 1 7  Prior to the 1990 enactment of the supplemental jurisdiction statute 
the Supreme Court held in Zahn v. International Paper Co. 1 1 8  that in the 
context of a class action invoking diversity jurisdiction, every plaintiff must 
separately satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement of the diversity 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.1 19 However, a plain reading of the language of 
§ 1367(b) permits the conclusion that Congress overturned Zahn because, 
although it withholds supplemental jurisdiction from claims asserted by parties 
joined under Rule 19 and Rule 24, it makes no mention of claims asserted by 
parties joined under Rule 20 or Rule 23. The Supreme Court adopted this 
interpretation of§ 1367(b) in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. 120 
Although opponents of this view suggested that the statute is ambiguous in this 
regard and that the legislative history reveals no intention to overrule Zahn, 121 
the Court found no ambiguity in the statute and thus rejected any notion that the 
statute's legislative history should be consulted.122 As a result, under the 
Court's reading of the statute in Allapattah Services, if there is one class 
member asserting a claim worth more than $75,000, § 1367(a) gives federal 
courts supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of all fellow class members, 
even though their claims may fall below the jurisdictional amount in 
controversy. 
The Court's reading of the statute is clearly correct, given the fact that 
parties joined under Rule 20 and Rule 23 are nowhere denied the benefits of 
115. Id. § 1367(b). 
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
117 FED. R. CIV. P. 20. 
118. Zahn v. Int'! Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), superseded by statute, Act ofDec. 1, 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5113. 
119. See Zahn, 414 U. S. at 301 ("Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy 
the jurisdictional amount."). 
120. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2621 (2005) (finding 
that § 1367 confers jurisdiction over claims brought by Rule 23 plaintiffs). 
121. See id. at 2625 ("The proponents of the alternative view of § 1367 insist that the 
statute is at least ambiguous and that we should look to other interpretive tools, including the 
legislative history of§ 1367, which supposedly demonstrate Congress did not intend § 1367 to 
overrule Zahn."). 
122. See id. ("We can reject this argument at the very outset simply because§ 1367 is not 
ambiguous."). 
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supplemental jurisdiction in the text of § 1367(b). However, Congress made 
clear in the House and Senate reports accompanying the legislation that 
overturning Zahn was not their intent. 1 23 Because ours is a nation governed by 
laws and not legislative committee reports, what matters is the language of the 
statute passed by Congress and signed by the President. 12
4 
Thus, the Court was 
correct to eschew any reliance on the legislative history and stick with the plain 
language of the statute. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the effect 
of § 1367(b) as interpreted by the Court is a substantial broadening of the 
jurisdiction of federal courts over state law claims. Section 1367(b) as 
interpreted by the Court is thus an instance of anti-federalist procedure because 
it permits large numbers of jurisdictionally insufficient non-federal claims to be 
heard in federal rather than state court simply by virtue of their relation to a 
jurisdictionally sufficient related state law claim. 
D. Federal Review of State Judicial Determinations 
The final variant of anti-federalist procedure comes in the form of federal 
review of state judicial determinations. Movement in an anti-federalist 
direction in this area has occurred on several fronts. In the area of punitive 
damages, the Supreme Court has constitutionalized the issue of the magnitude 
of punitive damages awards, enabling the Court to review and strike down 
punitive awards coming out of state courts.125 In the 2000 Presidential election, 
Bush v. Gore126 saw the Court intervening in Florida's electoral process to 
reverse the determination of that state's  courts regarding the need for a recount. 
In 2005, Congress intervened in a Florida right-to-die case by creating special 
federal jurisdiction that empowered the federal courts to review the 
determinations of state courts on the matter. 127 What connects these three 
1 23. H.R. REP. No. 10 1 -734, at 28-29 ( 1990) ("The section is not intended to affect the 
jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1 332 in diversity-only class actions, as those 
requirements were interpreted prior to Finley." ( citing Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 
U.S. 356 ( 192 1 )  and Zahn v. Int'! Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 ( 1973))). 
124. See ANTONCN SCALIA, A MA TIER OF INTERPRETATION 1 7  ( 1997) ("It is the law that 
governs, not the intent of the lawgiver . . . . Men may intend what they will; but it is only the 
laws that they enact which bind us."). 
1 25. See BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 5 1 7  U.S. 559, 562 (1996) (imposing Due Process 
limitations on punitive damages awards). 
126. See Bush v. Gore, 53 1 U.S. 98, 106 (2000) (determining the Florida Supreme Court's 
order for a manual recount without any other guidance to be an inadequate remedy). 
1 27. See Reliefofthe Parents ofTheresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § I ,  1 1 9 Stat. 
15,  15 (2005) (grantingjurisdiction to a Florida federal district court to hear a claim brought by 
Theresa Marie Schiavo's parents). 
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efforts is the willingness of the Court and Congress to engage in selective, 
robust federal review of matters that ordinarily should be treated as having been 
conclusively resolved by the state courts-intervention motivated largely by the 
perceived unfavorable results generated by the state courts. Each of these 
examples will be reviewed in tum. 
I. Due Process Remittitur 
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 128 the Supreme Court invested 
itself with the authority to review punitive damages awards imposed in state 
courts for "excessiveness" based on standards derived from the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Court wrote, "The Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a 
'grossly excessive' punishment on a tortfeasor."129 Excessiveness, the Court 
announced, was to be determined with reference to three "guideposts": "the 
degree of reprehensibility of the [ challenged conduct]; the disparity between the 
harm or potential harm suffered . . .  and [the] punitive damages award; and the 
difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in 
comparable cases."1 30 The Court subsequently declared that "the level of 
punitive damages is not really a 'fact' ' tried' by the jury," opening the door for 
the Court' s  utilization of a de nova standard of review for jury-imposed 
punitive damages awards. 1 3 1 More recently, the Court added, "[l]n practice, 
few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory 
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." 1
32 
The result of this series of Court opinions is that state courts are no longer 
the sole authorities over what level of punishment is appropriate for tortfeasors 
who violate state law. If the Supreme Court feels that the amount is too high 
because of its view that the offending conduct was insufficiently reprehensible, 
the Court may simply strike down the award. Of course, this doctrine then 
enables the Supreme Court to substitute its own judgment of reprehensibility 
for those of state legislatures and juries, something it has no right to do. 
128. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
129. Id. at 562 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U. S. 443, 454 
(1993)). 
130. Id. at 575. 
131. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U. S. 424, 437 (2001) 
(quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 459 (1996) ( Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
132. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408, 425 (2003). 
258 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233 (2007) 
Although it invokes the Due Process Clause as justification for this intrusion on 
state sovereign authority, as I have discussed in a previous article, there is no 
substantive due process protection against punitive damages beyond a certain 
level. 133 Federal excessiveness jurisprudence is thus not only an anti-federalist 
imposition on state prerogatives; it is illegitimate in its foundation on phony 
due process principles. 
2. Bush v. Gore 
Bush v. Gore134 provides another notable instance of federal review of 
state judicial determinations. Article II, § l of the U.S. Constitution provides: 
"Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, 
a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress."135 This 
provision unambiguously makes it the exclusive province of states to 
determine--through their regularly constituted and constrained legislatures­
the "Manner" of appointing presidential Electors. Indeed, the Court has 
affirmed that the authority of states in this sphere is "plenary. "136 However, 
once a state decides to allow its electorate to vote for the state's electors, that 
state may not arbitrarily treat the votes cast in a disparate manner. 137 The 
central issue in Bush v. Gore was whether Florida transgressed this principle in 
ordering manual recounts of votes cast to determine "the intent of the voter." 138 
The majority in Bush v. Gore held that largely because the standards for 
determining voter intent might differ from one county to the next or even 
within counties, the recount plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.139 
133. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process & Punitive Damages: The E"or of Federal 
Excessiveness Review, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 1085, 1088 (2006) ("What history and precedent 
indicate is that due process has never been construed to impair the common law practice of 
states permitting civil juries to award exemplary damages at levels they deem appropriate under 
the circumstances."). 
134. Bush v. Gore, 53 l U.S. 98 (2000). 
135. U.S. CONST. art. II, § l .  
136. See McPherson v. Blacker, 1 46 U.S. I, 35 ( l892) (deciding that the Constitution gives 
States the plenary power to decide how to choose their presidential electors). 
1 37. See Harper v. Va. Bd. ofElections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 ( l  966) ("[O]nce the franchise is 
granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
138. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1 05-06. 
139. See id. at l 06 (stating that voter intent standards would not be uniform throughout the 
state and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
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Although the propriety of such an application of the Equal Protection 
Clause can be and has been debated, 140 of more importance to our exploration 
of anti-federalist procedure was the Court's further determination that Florida 
would not be given the opportunity to design and implement a recount process 
that would alleviate these equal protection concerns. Finding that "[t]he 
Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature intended the State's 
electors to 'participat[ e] fully in the federal electoral process,' as provided in 3 
U.S.C. § 5," 141 and finding that a constitutional recount could not possibly be 
concluded by the December 12 "safe harbor"142 date established by 3 U.S.C. 
§ 5, the Court simply reversed the Florida Supreme Court's judgment that a 
recount proceed. 143 
Two things were remarkable about the Court's decision not to permit 
Florida to develop a constitutionally sound recount scheme. First, the Court's 
basis for doing so was thin; although the Court claimed that the Supreme Court 
of Florida had announced a legislative intent that Florida's "electors" 
"participat[ e] fully in the federal electoral process," the Florida high court said 
no such thing. Instead, here is what the Florida court said: 
[I]n this case involving a presidential election, we conclude that the 
reasoned basis for the exercise of the Department's discretion to ignore 
amended returns is limited to those instances where failure to ignore the 
amended returns will: . . .  in the case of a federal election, will result in 
Florida voters not partici/.!ating fully in the federal electoral process, as 
provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5. 44 
Florida's Supreme Court was speaking here about the discretionary rejection of 
amended returns in a federal election and laying down the rule that such 
discretion is appropriately exercised if the failure to do so would prevent voters 
(not "electors") from participating in the federal electoral process. Reference to 
140. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 657, 673-74 (200 l ) (defending Bush v. Gore's Equal Protection Clause holding); 
David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 737, 749-51 
(2001) (criticizing Bush v. Gore's Equal Protection Clause holding); Cass R. Sunstein, Order 
Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 758 (2001) ("[T]he Court's rationale was not only 
exceedingly ambitious but also embarrassingly weak. However appealing, its equal protection 
holding had no basis in precedent or in history."). 
141. Bush v. Gore, 53 l U.S. 98, I I O  (2000) (quoting Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 
v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1289 (Fla. 2000)); see 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000) (providing that ifa state 
legislature has provided for the final determination of contests or controversies by law, that 
determination shall be conclusive if made at least six days prior to the meeting of electors). 
142. Bush, 531 U.S. at I I 0. 
143. Id. 
144. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1289 (Fla. 2000). 
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3 U.S.C. § 5 is made in order to indicate that the deadlines contained therein 
must be taken into account when deciding whether to ignore amended 
retums. 145 Nothing in this statement commits the State of Florida to an 
unyielding policy of submitting a slate of electors by the deadline imposed by 3 
U.S.C. § 5. Rather, the Florida court was speaking only of the propriety of 
rejecting amended returns in an effort to meet that deadline. For the U.S. 
Supreme Court to misuse this statement by the Supreme Court of Florida as its 
sole basis for cutting off the recount was disingenuous. 
This brings us to the second difficulty with the Court's decision to 
preclude Florida from proceeding with a recount under a revised scheme: The 
U.S. Supreme Court completely usurped Florida's exclusive and plenary power 
over the appointment of electors as promised by Article II, § 1 of the U.S. 
Constitution. Florida has determined that its voters will select presidential 
electors and that in counting the votes of the electorate "the intent of the voter" 
must be determined, 146 a mandate that the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged 
was "unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and a starting principle."147 
Beyond the obligation to comply with the mandates of the Equal Protection 
Clause and other pertinent constitutional constraints, Florida, not the U.S. 
Supreme Court, is empowered to design, administer, and implement whatever 
process for selecting presidential electors it sees fit to pursue. It was for Florida 
to determine whether the votes of its voters had been properly and fully counted 
in the election of its electors, and if the state was going to miss the safe harbor 
deadline of 3 U.S.C. § 5 to make that determination, that was their prerogative. 
Missing the deadline is not unprecedented148 and only deprives the state of 
having its slate of electors treated as "conclusive."149 In favoring manual 
recounts, it appears that Florida had prioritized making sure that every vote was 
properly counted above receiving safe harbor protection for its electors. 
The problem is that the U.S. Supreme Court reached its own judgment 
regarding Florida's policy in this regard, contriving a non-existent Florida 
145. See id. ("However, in this case involving a presidential election, the decision as to 
when amended returns can be excluded from the statewide certification must necessarily be 
considered in conjunction with the contest provisions of section l 02.168 and the deadlines set 
forth in 3 U.S.C. § 5."). 
146. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1256 (Fla. 2000) (explaining that state legislation 
requires a legal vote to represent a voter's intent), rev 'd, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
147. Bush, 531 U.S. at 106. 
148. See id. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]n 1960, Hawaii appointed two slates of 
electors and Congress chose to count the one appointed on January 4, 1961, well after the Title 
3 deadlines." ( citing William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 
J. LEGIS. 145, 166 n.154 (1996))). 
149. 3 u.s.c. § 5 (2000). 
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legislative intent to meet the safe harbor deadline at all costs and purporting to 
render its decision in deference to that intent. The anti-federalist aspects of the 
process now become clear. Constitutionally, the procedure for selecting 
electors is the exclusive province of the states, as is the procedure for resolving 
controversies surrounding their selection. 150 Establishing the selection process 
is a state legislative concern as is establishing the process for resolving election 
controversies. The actual resolution of those controversies, to the extent they 
tum on issues of state electoral law, is ultimately for a state's judiciary. The 
Supreme Court's intervention into this sphere, not to enforce federal 
constitutional guarantees, but rather to pronounce Florida policy respecting the 
selection of electors and to bring an end to a process that Florida had 
determined should continue, deprived Florida of its constitutional power to 
"appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of 
Electors." 1 5 1  In doing so, the Court deprived Florida of an express power 
granted to it under the Constitution, arrogated that power unto itself, 
transgressed the principle oflimited federal government, and trammeled on the 
right of states to resolve conclusively issues of state law, all in one fell swoop. 
What prompted the Court's failure to defer to Florida's interpretation and 
application of its own laws? Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a separate concurring 
opinion stated, "Though we generally defer to state courts on the interpretation 
of state law, there are of course areas in which the Constitution requires this 
Court to undertake an independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law." 1 52 
This was one of those areas, Rehnquist explained, because "[a] significant 
departure from the legislative scheme for appointing Presidential electors 
presents a federal constitutional question" 153 and the question before the Court 
was whether the Supreme Court of Florida's judgment represented an 
impermissible departure from Florida's selection scheme. The Court concluded 
that it did. 1 54 More explanatory may be one commentator's analysis: "[T]his 
Court found the national interests at stake-what it perceived as the fairness 
and reliability of the presidential election result-more compelling than 
1 50. Bush v. Gore, 53 1 U.S. 98, 1 13 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("Art. 11, § 1 , cl. 
2 'convey[ s] the broadest power of determination' and 'leaves it to the legislature exclusively to 
define the method' of appointment." (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 1 46 U.S. 1 ,  8 ( 1 892))). 
1 5 1 .  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 .  
1 52. Bush, 53 1 U.S. at 1 14 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
1 53. Id. at 1 13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
1 54. See id. at 120 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("For the court to step away from this 
established practice, prescribed by the Secretary [ of State] . . .  was to depart from the legislative 
scheme."). 
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Florida's sovereignty interest in resolving its own election controversy."1 55 In 
other words, it was more important-in the Court's view-to bring the 
presidential election to a secure conclusion than the chaos that would have 
ensued were Florida's authority respected and its recount permitted to go 
forward. 
Although the validity of the Court's conclusion that the recount would 
impermissibly depart from Florida's electoral scheme constituted a significant 
aspect of the decision, the remedy the Court selected-reversal of the Florida 
Supreme Court's decision and the cutting off of any recounts-is what makes 
the Court's  decision fundamentally anti-federalist. As was done in the Court's 
per curiam majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist in his concurrence relied 
upon the strained notion that the Florida legislature had made taking advantage 
of the safe harbor provided by 3 U.S. C. § 5 an absolute priority that constrained 
any efforts state courts might undertake in resolving electoral controversies. 1 56 
As discussed earlier, that this was actually the position of the Florida legislature 
is not something that the Court convincingly established. Nor was it something 
for the U.S. Supreme Court to declare. True respect for the constitutional 
authority of Florida's legislature to select electors, and of the authority of 
Florida's courts to adjudicate ensuing disputes would have demanded a remand 
to the Supreme Court of Florida to enable it to determine whether the 
legislature did indeed prioritize meeting the safe harbor deadline over verifying 
a proper count of votes and to fashion a constitutionally acceptable recount 
procedure if necessary, the impending passage of the safe harbor deadline 
notwithstanding. As the Court ironically noted in its per curiam opinion, "The 
press of time does not diminish the constitutional concern. A desire for speed 
is not a general excuse for ignoring equal protection guarantees. "1 57 Neither 
should the press of time have motivated the Court to usurp Florida's 
constitutional entitlement to control the selection ofits presidential electors and 
determine its legislative intent for itself. 
1 55. Bradley W. Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism, and the Distrust of Politics, 62 
Omo ST. L.J. 1 781 ,  1804 (2001 ). 
1 56. See Bush v. Gore, 53 1 U.S. 98, 120-21 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("The 
scope and nature of the remedy ordered by the Florida Supreme Court jeopardizes the legislative 
wish to take advantage of the safe harbor provided by 3 U.S.C. § 5.") (citations omitted); see 
also id. at 1 2 1  (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("Surely when the Florida Legislature empowered 
the courts of the State to grant 'appropriate' relief, it must have meant relief that would have 
become final by the cutoff date of 3 U.S.C. § 5."). 
157. Id. at 1 08. 
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3. The Case of Terri Schiavo 
On March 21, 2005 Congress enacted legislation entitled "Relief of the 
Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo" (Terri's Law). 1 58 The Act was in response 
to decisions by Florida state courts that Ms. Schiavo was in a persistent 
vegetative state and that she would have elected to forego further use of a 
feeding tube. 159 Terri's Law conferred jurisdiction over any federal claims 
pertaining to the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment, foods or 
fluids from Ms. Schiavo to the United States District Court for the Middle 
District ofFlorida. 160 Terri's Law also granted standing to the parents of Ms. 
Schiavo to bring suit 
against any other person who was a party to State court proceedings 
relating to the withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical 
treatment necessary to sustain the life of Theresa Marie Schiavo, or who 
may act pursuant to a State court order authorizing or directing the 
withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary 
to sustain her life. 161 
Pursuant to this Act, Ms. Schiavo' s parents filed suit in Florida federal court, 
seeking a temporary restraining order directing Ms. Schiavo's guardian and the 
hospice where she was located to transport her to a hospital for medical 
treatment.162 Both the district court 163 and the Eleventh Circuit 164 rejected the 
parents' request for a temporary restraining order and the Supreme Court 
declined to intervene. 165 
The anti-federalist attributes of Terri's Law are obvious. Florida's 
determination regarding Ms. Schiavo's medical condition and her wishes 
regarding death were matters of Florida state law that had been conclusively 
resolved by Florida's courts. Nevertheless, because Congress and the President 
disagreed with the decision made by the courts, they took the extraordinary step 
1 58. Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 1 19 Stat. 15 
(2005). 
1 59. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 9 16  So. 2d 8 14, 8 19  (Fla. App. 2005) (upholding 
the lower court's decision to terminate life-sustaining procedures). 
1 60. Reliefofthe Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo § I ,  1 19 Stat. at 15 .  
1 6 1 .  Id. § 2 ,  1 19 Stat. at 1 5 .  
1 62. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1 16 1 ,  1 1 63-64 (M.D. Fla. 
2005) (deciding that the plaintiffs had not established the necessary elements for granting a 
temporary restraining order). 
1 63. Id. at 1 1 68. 
1 64. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F. 3d 1 289, 1303 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2005). 
1 65. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 544 U.S. 945 (2005) (denying the petition 
for writ of certiorari). 
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of enacting legislation on behalf of one individual to provide a federal forum 
for challenging compliance with the state courts' decrees. Ordinarily, under the 
so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 166 lower federal courts have no jurisdiction 
over "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by 
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 
judgments."167 Such appellate jurisdiction is limited to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 168 Terri's Law nullified this doctrine but only for one special case. In 
doing so, the Act's proponents clearly violated principles of federalism that 
many of them otherwise held dear. 169 
III. Analysis & Critique 
Although many of the demerits of anti-federalist procedure have already 
been alluded to, this Part undertakes a more comprehensive analysis of the 
deeper issues raised by this phenomenon. The critique will be fivefold. First, 
to the extent that Congress has relied upon its authority under the Commerce 
Clause to interfere with state judicial prerogatives as described above, such 
reliance has been misplaced. Neither the clause itself nor the Supreme Court's 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence provides Congress with any authority to limit 
the award of punitive damages by state courts, to require the application of Rule 
11 in state court, or to determine intrastate venue in personal injury cases tried 
in state court. Second, the Guarantee Clause-a provision written off by many, 
including the Supreme Court, as moribund-should be read to preclude the 
1 66. The name for this doctrine is drawn from Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 261 U.S. 1 14 
( 1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
167. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U. S. 280,284 (2005). 
168. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000) ( "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest 
court of a State in which a decision could be had may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."). 
169. David Davenport of the Hoover Institute criticized Terri's Law by stating: 
When a case like this has been heard by 19 judges in six courts and it's been 
appealed to the Supreme Court three times, the process has worked-even if it 
hasn't given the result that the social conservatives want. For Congress to step in 
really is a violation of federalism. 
Adam Nagoumey, G.O.P. Right Is Splintered on Schiavo Intervention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 
2005, at A l  4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/23/politics/23repubs.html?ei=5088 
&en=3 701736315233 581 &ex= l 269234000&partner=rssnyt&pagewanted=print&position=. 
Stephen Moore, president of the Free Enterprise Fund, was quoted in the same article as having 
said, "I don't normally like to see the federal government intervening in a situation like this, 
which I think should be resolved ultimately by the family: I think states' rights should take 
precedence over federal intervention. A lot of conservatives are really struggling with this 
case." Id. 
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degree of interference with state judiciaries contemplated by anti-federalist 
legislation. Third, principles offederalism enshrined in the Tenth Amendment 
cast doubt on the validity of the federal imposition on state judiciaries via the 
congressional enactments and Court decisions described above. Fourth, 
expansive grants of federal jurisdiction and interpretations of federal 
jurisdictional statutes run afoul of the limitations set forth in Article III by 
empowering federal courts to hear cases the Constitution neglects to place 
within their authority. Finally, this Part will challenge the doctrinal consistency 
of the proponents of anti-federalist procedure, highlighting their tendency to 
support principles offederalism and states' rights in most instances but forsake 
those principles in the procedural areas reviewed above. 
A. A Misuse of the Commerce Clause Power 
Current understandings of the Commerce Clause preclude congressional 
efforts to constrain the authority of state courts to impose punitive damages 
awards in state law cases. 1 70 Modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence permits 
Congress to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce, and activities that "substantially affect"1 71 interstate 
commerce. 1 72 State courts are not "channels" or "instrumentalities" of interstate 
commerce and thus can only be regulated if their activity falls under the third 
170. Professor Bellia has previously addressed the question of the propriety of regulating 
state court procedures under the Commerce Clause but his answer was ultimately too equivocal 
and unsatisfactory: 
[The] constitutionality [ of the Y2K Act's regulation of state court procedure] thus 
may depend on whether the Commerce Clause permits only direct regulation of 
economic activity or regulation of noneconomic activity that has substantial 
economic effects. Until that question is resolved, Congress's authority to regulate 
state court procedures under Article I remains open to question. 
Bellia, supra note 9, at 970. 
171. Although the Court has not shirked from the notion that activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce may be reached under the Commerce Clause, it is worth noting that 
this strain of the doctrine arguably stretches the clause beyond its originally understood 
meaning. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
("[Tihe very notion of a 'substantial effects' test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent 
with the original understanding of Congress' powers and with this Court's early Commerce 
Clause cases."). Although challenging this aspect of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is beyond 
the scope of this article, the contested validity of the substantial effects test should caution 
against expansive applications of the doctrine to permit the regulation ofnon-economic activity 
traditionally falling within the states' spheres of authority. 
172. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (reiterating the rule that "Congress has 
the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce"). 
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category-referred to as the "substantial effects" test. But the Court has thus 
far confined congressional authority to regulate activity under this test to 
"economic" activity, 1 73 a characterization one cannot fairly ascribe to the 
adjudication of claims by state courts . Although the outcomes of state court 
adjudication of commercial disputes may substantially affect interstate 
commerce, the adjudication of claims in and of itself does not constitute 
economic activity. Rather, state court adjudication is quintessential 
governmental activity-the operation of the state's official mechanism for 
hearing and resolving claims seeking redress for violation of state laws. States 
open their courts to the resolution of disputes not as a business enterprise, but 
as a fundamental component of the exercise of their law enforcement authority 
within their respective jurisdictions. Labeling such activity "economic" is a 
stretch at best. 
Congressional attempts to regulate state punitive damages awards run into 
further difficulty because they purport to regulate an area within the traditional 
sphere of state authority. The Court has noted that activity cannot be regulated 
under the Commerce Clause solely based on the activity's aggregate effect on 
interstate commerce when the activity falls within areas of traditional state 
regulation. 1 74 This limitation is meant to prevent Congress from exercising, via 
the Commerce Clause, a plenary police power of the kind that has been 
reserved to the states. 175 As the Court explained in United States v. 
Morrison, 176 permitting violent crimes against women to be regulated based on 
their aggregate effects on interstate commerce "will not limit Congress to 
1 73. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 6 1 3  ("While we need not adopt a categorical rule against 
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in 
our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity 
only where that activity is economic in nature."). Speaking of its decision in Morrison, the 
Raich Court explained: 
Despite congressional findings that such crimes had an adverse impact on interstate 
commerce, we held the [Violence Against Women Act] unconstitutional because, 
like the statute in Lopez, it did not regulate economic activity. We concluded that 
"the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our 
decision in Lopez . . . .  " 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added) (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 6 10). 
174. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 6 15-1 6 ("Petitioners' reasoning, moreover, will not limit 
Congress to regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as well to 
family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, 
divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant."); id at 6 17  ("We 
accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal 
conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce."). 
175. See United States v. Lopez, 5 14  U.S. 549, 566 ( 1995) ("The Constitution . . .  
withhold(s] from Congress a plenary police power."). 
176. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as 
well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the 
aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy 
is undoubtedly significant." 177 Because "the Constitution requires a distinction 
between what is truly national and what is truly local," 178 such interference with 
traditional state bailiwicks based on their inevitable aggregate effects on 
interstate commerce cannot be permitted consistent with the notion of a 
national government of limited powers. 
The fixing and award of punitive damages for judgments on state law 
claims tried in state courts has always been the province of the states, 179 
rendering congressional attempts to regulate in this area improper under the 
Commerce Clause. As I have explained elsewhere, states have always enjoyed 
a pre-constitutional right to empower juries to impose punitive damages as they 
see fit, and this power was not yielded to the federal government in the 
Constitution. 180 Thus, Congress's efforts to use its Commerce Clause authority 
to limit the remedies that state courts can provide for the vindication of state 
law claims trample on states' exercise of a reserved power and usurps the 
states' exercise of their police powers, substituting a federal police power in its 
place. The Commerce Clause does not now nor was it ever intended to permit 
Congress to control remedies available under state law in state courts. The 
Supreme Court has written that the Commerce Clause "authorizes Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate 
state governments' regulation of interstate commerce." 181 This principle 
applies with equal force to state courts: The Commerce Clause does not 
authorize Congress to regulate state governments' adjudication of commercial 
disputes based on state law, 182 a process that is part and parcel of a state's 
exercise of its police power. In sum, regulating non-economic activity (state 
court adjudication), in an area of traditional state regulation (punitive damages 
for state law claims), by regulating courts rather than economic actors 
themselves-all based on the idea that such adjudications substantially affect 
interstate commerce-is a few bridges too far. 
177. Id.at 615-l6. 
178. Id. at 617-l8. 
179. See Spencer, supra note 133, at 1125 ("[I]t is clear that states traditionally have been 
unconstrained in their ability to award punitive damages."). 
180. Id. 
181. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
182. See Bellia, supra note 9, at 966 ("Historically, even the most contested exercises of 
the commerce power have operated directly upon the primary economic activity of individuals 
rather than upon how disputes arising from that economic activity are litigated."). 
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The same analysis applies to the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act's 
command that state courts apply Rule 1 1  of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to state court proceedings in all cases where they determine that the 
action would "substantially affect[] interstate commerce."1 83 Although this 
language attempts to exploit the substantial effects test as a hook for Congress's 
regulation of state court procedure in this regard, as discussed above, Congress 
may not regulate the operation of state courts under the Commerce Clause 
because state court adjudication of state law claims is a non-economic activity 
within the traditional sphere of authority retained by the states. 184 Congress 
certainly can legislate in areas of interstate commerce and provide for exclusive 
federal court jurisdiction over disputes involving those matters, in which case 
the federal rules of civil procedure could properly be applied; however, 
Congress can hardly claim the authority to require that states follow the federal 
procedural rules when adjudicating state law claims in their own courts. 
B. Violation of the Guarantee Clause 
Article IV, § 4 of the United States Constitution provides: "The United 
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government . . . .  "185 There are two sides to the Guarantee Clause: 186 a 
limitation on states and a limitation on the federal government. States are 
183. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 1 09th Cong. § 3 ( 1st Sess. 2005). 
184. See supra Part II.A ( discussing instances in which state courts have been ousted of 
their jurisdiction over certain common law tort claims). 
185. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
186. It should be noted at the outset that the Court has long viewed claims based on the 
Guarantee Clause as nonjusticiable. See New York, 505 U.S. at 184 ("In most of the cases in 
which the Court has been asked to apply the Clause, the Court has found the claims presented to 
be non justiciable under the 'political question' doctrine."). Thus, the vision of the Guarantee 
Clause propounded herein would have to "overcome deeply held notions that the Clause is 
non justiciable." Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A 
New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. Cow. L. REv. 8 15, 822 ( 1994). As Professor 
Richard Fallon recently pointed out, the possibility of a relaxation of the Court's absolute 
nonjusticiability position is not far-fetched: 
Several prominent Supreme Court decisions have held that Guarantee Clause cases 
present non justiciable political questions. In New York [ v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144 ( 1992)] however, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion signaled a potential 
willingness to consider whether the reach of those decisions should be limited . . . .  
Although inconclusive, this discussion held out the plain possibility that the Court 
might treat some Guarantee Clause claims as justiciable in the future, even if it 
adhered to the view that others are not. 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 1 19 
HARV. L. REv. 1274, 1308 n. 1 58 (2006) (citations omitted). 
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required, as a matter of federal constitutional law, to vest power in the people to 
select and control their rulers . 1 87 More importantly for our purposes is the 
admonition the clause gives to the federal government: The federal 
government may not interfere with states' autonomy to such an extent that it 
prevents them from enjoying "untrammeled self-government." I 88 This notion 
derives from the fact that undue interference with state autonomy eviscerates 
popular sovereignty, supplanting republican self-governance by the people with 
federal control of state authorities. It cannot be gainsaid that "a separate and 
independent judiciary is an indispensable element of a republican form of 
government" 189 and thus state courts must properly be regarded as an essential 
piece of the republican form protected by the clause. In light of these 
principles, congressional enactments that either directly control state courts or 
that eliminate their ability to adjudicate state law claims pursuant to their 
respective charters of authority offend republicanism in a way the Guarantee 
Clause should be seen as competent to prevent. 
The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act would have crossed this line. The bill 
called for the application of Rule 1 1  to state court proceedings that 
"substantially affect[] interstate commerce" 190 and also mandated that personal 
injury claims filed in state court be filed in the state and county in which either 
of the parties resides or where the injury occurred . 191 Both of these provisions 
transgress the Guarantee Clause because the federal prescription of civil 
procedure for state courts would prevent states from prescribing such procedure 
themselves. Because promulgating its own judicial procedure is an ordinary 
function of state government, the Guarantee Clause bars the federal government 
from taking this power out of the hands of state citizens and arrogating it unto 
itself. 192 When states cannot control their own judicial procedure, the people 
187. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism 
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1 ,  23 ( 1988) ("[A] republican government is one in 
which the people control their rulers. That control, moreover, is exerted principally--although 
not exclusively-through majoritarian processes."). 
188. WILLIAM WIECEK, THE GUARANTEECLAUSEOFTIIE U.S. CONSTITIJTION 294 ( 1972); see 
Merritt, supra note 187, at 22-23 ("[l)n the guarantee clause the United States promises to 
secure each of the states the autonomy necessary to maintain a republican form of government. 
The guarantee clause, therefore, provides an essential constitutional limit on federal interference 
with state autonomy."). 
189. Bauers v. Heisel, 361  F.2d 581 , 588 (3d Cir. 1966) (en bane), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 
102 1  ( 1967); see County of Lane v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 7 1 ,  76 ( 1869) (indicating that 
states are "endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence"). 
1 90. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 1 09th Cong.§ 3 ( 1 st Sess. 2005). 
19 1 .  Id. § 4. 
1 92. Cf United States v. Downey, 195 F. Supp. 581 , 585 (S.D. Ill. 1961)  (holding that the 
federal government cannot promulgate rules for criminal procedure in the State courts because 
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no longer control the judicial arm of their respective state governments; instead, 
the federal government controls the state judiciary, meaning that republicanism 
no longer prevails. Such a state of affairs would transform state governments 
from sovereign republican entities into subordinate administrative units of the 
central national government. The conversion of states into administrative 
subordinates or mere colonial outposts of the federal government must be 
viewed as an outcome that the Guarantee Clause cannot tolerate. When the 
states are relegated to subordinate units or instrumentalities of the federal 
government to be commandeered and directed according to the federal will, 
particularly with respect to matters reserved to state control, they are stripped of 
their autonomy and are prevented from maintaining and operating the 
government of laws instituted by their respective citizenries. 
The affront to the Guarantee Clause imposed by the Class Action Fairness 
Act is more tentative and subtle. Although CAP A operates to enlarge the 
diversity jurisdiction of federal courts to embrace the filing and removal of 
certain putative class actions, the practical result ofCAF A will most likely not 
simply be the litigation of certain class actions in federal versus state court; 
rather, some if not many of the cases that otherwise would have been litigated 
as class actions in state court will face more challenging class certification 
standards that will prevent the cases from moving forward at all. 193 That this 
might occur was Congress's stated expectation in its report supporting the 
doing so would "disregard the provisions of [the Guarantee Clause]," which precludes the 
federal government from "prevent[ing] a state from discharging its ordinary functions of 
government"). 
1 93 .  The more stringent class certification and settlement standards imposed by the 
Supreme Court in cases likeAmchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 52 l U.S. 591 (1997), and Ortiz 
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 8 15  ( 1999), particularly with respect to the predominance 
requirement for damages classes, will likely stymie more putative class actions removed to 
federal court than would be the case were those cases to remain in state courts. See Morrison, 
supra note 60, at 1 522 ("[U]nderlying the arguments about whether these cases 'ought' to be in 
state or federal court is a deeply held belief by each side that the choice of forum will 
significantly affect the outcome of the case."). Congress recognized the heightened scrutiny of 
class certifications by federal judges in its committee report accompanying CAF A: 
The Committee finds, however, that one reason for the dramatic explosion of class 
actions in state courts is that some state court judges are less careful than their 
federal court counterparts about applying the procedural requirements that govern 
class actions. In particular, many state court judges are lax about following the 
strict requirements of Rule 23 (or the state's parallel governing rule), which are 
intended to protect the due process rights of both unnamed class members and 
defendants. In contrast, federal courts generally scrutinize proposed settlements 
much more carefully and pay closer attention to the procedural requirements for 
certifying a matter for class treatment. 
S. REP. No. 1 09- 14, at 14 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14. 
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legislation. 194 To the extent that state law class actions are removed to federal 
court under CAF A and decertified, state courts are robbed of the opportunity to 
adjudicate claims that might have vindicated important state law interests and 
possible transgressions of state law go unchallenged. In effect, then, CAF A in 
these instances will nullify state law by neutering the ability of state courts to 
enforce violations thereof and by moving them into a federal forum only to be 
dismissed, a process I refer to as "CAF A nullification." 
The essence of a republican form of government "is the right of the people 
to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and pass their 
own laws." 195 When the state judiciary-the arm of government responsible for 
interpreting and applying popularly authorized state laws-effectively loses the 
ability to adjudicate claims arising under state law through CAF A nullification, 
the state no longer retains control over the just administration of its laws. 
Because Article III expressly extends the federal judicial power to cases 
described in CAF A, this usurpation in and of itself cannot be the source of 
complaint. The problem is federal courts' application of stringent federal 
certification standards to decertify and dismiss removed class actions that 
would have been permitted to proceed in state court. The result in such 
circumstances is that the will of the people ( expressed through their duly 
selected state officials) to provide a state law right and state judicial remedy is 
nullified and self-governance dies. Not only does CAF A nullification 
undermine republicanism, it compromises the rule oflaw by stripping states of 
the ability to enforce the law in certain instances and it interferes with the right 
of citizens to petition their respective state governments for the redress of 
grievances. 196 
C. An Affront to Federalism 
Our Constitution creates a federal system in which the original sovereignty 
of the states is retained to the extent it has not been surrendered to the national 
government expressly. The vision of the Framers, as expressed by James 
Madison, was that " [t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the 
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the 
194. See id. at 64 ("The only thing that would be denied when an interstate class action is 
removed to federal court is the plaintiffs' lawyers' ability to strike it rich on class actions that 
should not be certified by any court because they do not meet the requirements of a proper 
class."). 
195. In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 46 1 ( 1891). 
196. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging . . .  the right of 
the people . . .  to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."). 
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State governments are numerous and indefinite."
197 The limited government 
thus described was assured via the adoption of the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments to the Constitution. The Ninth Amendment provides, "The 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny 
or disparage others retained by the people." 198 The Tenth Amendment 
provides, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people." 199 As I have written elsewhere: 
Together, the Ninth Amendment, which guards "against a latitude of 
interpretation," and the Tenth Amendment, which "exclud[ es] every source 
of power not within the constitution itself," combine to impose a "federalist 
rule of constitutional construction" that bars any interpretation of the 
Constitution that either infringes upon rights retained by the peo£le or 
arrogates to the national government power reserved to the states. 2 
The Tenth Amendment in particular, which makes the states all powerful in 
areas where they have not ceded authority to the federal government, is a major 
bulwark against federal incursions into the sphere of authority intended to be 
confined to the states. Thus, the Court has emphasized that "judicial 
enforcement of the Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal 
system so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the 
Constitution. 11201 
Congress's misuse of the Commerce Clause to regulate state courts 
directly is a clear violation of the Tenth Arnendment.202 Once it is 
acknowledged that the substantial effects test does not permit Congress to 
require application of Rule 11  in state courts or to determine venue within state 
judicial systems, no other provision remains as a source for such regulation, 
1 97 .  THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1  
Cranch) 137 ,  1 76  (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The powers of the legislature are defined and 
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written."). 
1 98. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
1 99. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
200. Spencer, supra note 1 33, at 1 1 40 (citations omitted). 
201 .  Garcia v .  San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 570 (1985) (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
202. Professor Tribe made a similar comment with respect to the proposed National 
Tobacco Settlement. A Review of the Global Tobacco Settlement: Hearing before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 05th Cong. 1 60 (1997) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe) ("For 
Congress directly to regulate the procedures used by state courts in adjudicating state law tort 
claims---to forbid them, for example, from applying their generally applicable class action 
procedures in cases involving tobacco suits-would raise serious questions under the Tenth 
Amendment and principles of federalism."). 
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which indicates that the regulation of state judicial procedure hearing state law 
claims was a matter reserved to the states.203 Because states retain authority 
over their respective judiciaries under the Tenth Amendment, the Court has 
indicated that "the procedure by which rights may be enforced and wrongs 
remedied is peculiarly a subject of state regulation and control. "204 Clearly, 
then, if Congress cannot control state judicial procedure through the Commerce 
Clause, the Tenth Amendment makes such efforts unconstitutional. 
Similarly, Congress's attempts to limit punitive damages awards-an 
effort not sanctioned by the Commerce Clause-transgress the reserved 
authority of states to control the remedies to be available for violations of their 
laws. As the Supreme Court remarked long ago, "There can, of course, be no 
doubt of the general principle that matters respecting the remedy . . .  depend 
upon the law of the place where the suit is brought. 11205 States have traditionally 
controlled punitive damages awards on state law claims heard in their courts, 
making congressional limitations of this non-economic activity a non-starter 
under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence and thus unconstitutional per 
the Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court's attempt to limit punitive 
damages via the Due Process Clause fares no better; as I have explained in a 
previous writing: 
By interpreting the Due Process Clause in a manner that co-opts the 
authority of state j uries to determine the appropriate level of punitive 
damages and instead permits the U.S. Supreme Court to do so, the Court 
has engaged in precisely the expansive and aggrandizing constitutional 
interpretation prohibited by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.206 
Neither Congress nor the Court, then, can limit the availability or amount of 
punitive damages in state law cases consistent with the mandate of the Tenth 
Amendment. 
The Court's implied preemption doctrine contravenes the Tenth 
Amendment as well because the doctrine empowers the Court to declare that 
a statute preempts state law notwithstanding the absence of a congressional 
mandate to that effect. Congress unquestionably has the power to legislate in 
203. See Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 3 1 1 , 315 (1843) ("[U]ndoubtedly, a state 
may regulate at pleasure the modes of proceeding in its courts . . . .  "). 
204. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 1 5 1 ,  1 58 ( 193 1 ); see 
also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 
508 (1954) ("The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of 
state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them."), quoted in 
Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 9 1 1 ,  9 19  (1997); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990). 
205. Cent. Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 511 ( 19 14) (citations omitted). 
206. Spencer, supra note 133, at 1 1 42. 
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areas within its constitutional grant of authority and direct that such 
enactments preempt relevant state law. However, the Court lacks this 
authority; thus, when it reads preemption into a statute where Congress has 
not expressly provided for it or expressed its intention that there be 
preemption, the Court illegitimately nullifies state laws and judicial 
procedures meant to be protected by the Tenth Amendment. Further, the 
Court has endorsed a presumption of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction, 
rebuttable only "by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable 
implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between 
state-court jurisdiction and federal interests. 11207 The Court's implied 
preemption jurisprudence goes against this notion, reaching out to invalidate 
state jurisdiction without the clarity or explicitness the Court has otherwise 
indicated should be required given the implications for state sovereignty. 
The same can be said of the Court's broad interpretation of federal 
question and removal jurisdiction. The Court has stated that "[d]ue regard 
for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate 
federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction 
to the precise limits which the statute has defined. 11208 But the Court has not 
adhered to its own admonition. Permitting arising under jurisdiction in the 
face of congressional failure to provide for a private right of action is hardly 
consistent with the admonition to "confine . . .  jurisdiction to the precise 
limits11209 defined by jurisdictional statutes. Similarly, although the Court has 
insisted on a "strict construction" of the federal removal statutes,21 0  
transmogrifying state law claims into federal claims through the complete 
preemption doctrine is anything but a strict construction of the removal 
statute, which requires that the removed claims "arise under" federal, not 
state law. Both instances of overly-broad interpretations of federal 
jurisdiction have the effect of ripping away from states the practical ability to 
adjudicate state law claims that they have every right to adjudicate per the 
Tenth Amendment in the absence of a valid exercise of Congressional 
authority. 
207. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981). 
208. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934). 
209. Id. 
210. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U. S. 100, 108 (194l ) ( "Not only does 
the language of the Act of 1887 evidence the Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts on removal, but the policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the 
jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of such legislation."). 
ANTI-FEDERALIST PROCEDURE 275 
D. Exceeding A rticle Ill 's Grant of Jurisdiction 
Unwarranted expansions of federal jurisdiction result in vesting federal 
courts with the ability to hear cases over which Article III fails to confer 
jurisdiction. Thus, in the instance of the complete preemption doctrine, by 
declaring that preempted state law claims "arise under" federal law when in 
reality they do not gives federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving non­
diverse parties where only state law claims are asserted, a category of cases the 
federal judiciary is not empowered to hear. Congress, when legislating 
pursuant to its constitutional authority, may always declare that preempted state 
law claims indeed do arise under federal rather than state law and are thus 
removable. However, the Supreme Court may not itself make such a 
declaration; it may only enforce Congress's determination that such is the case. 
Congress's  extension of standing to Terri Schiavo' s  parents to assert 
claims on her behalf also drew the federal courts into a case not falling within 
their Article III jurisdictional grant. The parents of Ms. Schiavo were not her 
legal guardians but were permitted under the Act to pursue claims asserting 
violations of Ms. Schiavo's rights, not their own. Under ordinarily applicable 
principles, Ms. Schiavo's  parents would lack both Article III standing and 
prudential standing to assert the array of federal statutory and constitutional 
violations they claimed in their suit. Article III standing requires the plaintiff to 
have suffered an "injury in fact" that a favorable judgment will redress, while 
prudential standing "encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant's  raising 
another person's  legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized 
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the 
requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests 
protected by the law invoked. "2 1 1  
Ms. Schiavo's parents spectacularly failed to meet these standards. The 
injuries presented by her parents in federal court were alleged violations of Ms. 
Schiavo's  rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act,212  the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1 973,213 the Due Process Clause,2 14 and the Eighth 
2 1 1 .  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. l ,  1 2  (2004). 
2 1 2. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d l l6 1 ,  l l 64 (M.D. Fla. 
2005) ("Plaintiffs allege that the failure and refusal of Defendant Michael Schiavo to furnish 
Theresa Schiavo with necessary and appropriate therapy, rehabilitation services and essential 
medical services and his demand that she be deprived of food and water violate her rights under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act.") (emphasis added). 
2 13. Id. at 1 1 65 ("Plaintiffs allege that Hospice of Florida Sun Coast, Inc. violated Theresa 
Schiavo's right to rehabilitation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1 973.") (citation omitted). 
2 14. Id. at 1 1 66 ("Count Eight alleges that Theresa Schiavo's Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights were violated . . . .  "). 
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Amendment.215 Presenting no injury of their own but merely those alleged to 
have been suffered by one they could not claim to represent under Florida 
law,216 Ms. Schiavo's parents clearly lacked Article III and prudential standing. 
Because Article III standing is a constitutional requirement necessary for 
federal jurisdiction, Congress is not empowered to waive the requirement under 
any circumstances. Thus, the extension offederal jurisdiction to the parents of 
Terri Schiavo was unconstitutional. 
E. Doctrinal Hypocrisy 
In the "Contract with America," Republicans promised that giving them 
control of the House of Representatives would mean "the end of government 
that is too big, too intrusive . . . .  "217 But the same document promised to 
introduce The Common Sense Legal Reform Act, a bill, which, as noted above, 
sought to cap punitive damages awards in state law cases tried in state court, a 
traditionally state-level prerogative.2 18 Indeed, it was widely known that the 
philosophy behind the "Contract with America" was one of devolution of 
power to the states,219 yet Republican controlled Congresses have been 
responsible for the federal tort reform measures discussed above and for the 
private legislation intervening in the Terri Schiavo case. President George W. 
Bush, a Republican, has similarly mouthed the rhetoric of federalism: "The 
framers of the Constitution did not believe in an all-knowing, all-powerful 
Federal Government. They believed that our freedom is best preserved when 
power is dispersed. That is why they limited and enumerated the Federal 
Government's powers, and reserved the remaining functions of government to 
the States. "220 Nevertheless, Mr. Bush also joined the Terri Schiavo 
215. Id at 1 1 67 ("Plaintiffs assert that 'Judge Greer and Michael Schiavo, as state actors, 
have vioated [sic] Terri Schiavo's Eighth Amendment rights by demonstrating a deliberate 
indifference to a know [sic], substantial risk of serious harm . . . .  "') ( citation omitted). 
2 16. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1384 (M.D. Fla. 
2005) ("[T]he state court appointed Michael Schiavo, Theresa Schiavo's husband, as plenary 
guardian and proxy for Theresa."). 
217. Contract with America, http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2006) ( on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
218. Id. 
219. See, e.g., CONTRACT WITII AMERICA, supra note 7, at 125--41 (explaining the 
Republican platform during the 104th Congress). 
220. Remarks at the National Governors' Association Conference, 2001 PUB. PAPERS 132-
33 (Feb. 26, 2001 ), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001 /02/20010226-
8.html. 
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bandwagon, favoring the promotion of "a culture of life" over adherence to the 
federalist principles he ordinarily espouses.221 
The Supreme Court also has embraced states' rights, articulating in a string of 
cases over the past decade or so a robust vision of constitutional federalism.222 The 
Court has intoned that "[i]t is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty 
that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of 
authority,"223 invoking our system's "dual sovereignty" to invalidate congressional 
efforts to protect women against violence,224 to keep school zones free of guns,225 
and to require state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on 
prospective handgun purchasers. 226 At the same time, the Court has vacated state­
imposed punitive damages awards,227 halted the recount process ordered by 
Florida's highest court pursuant to state law in the exercise of authority granted to 
states under Article 11,228 maintained the doctrines of implied229 and complete230 
22 1 .  Press Release, President George W. Bush, President's  Statement on Terri Schiavo 
(Mar. 1 7, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/200503 l 7-7 .html (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
222. See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 25 ("Perhaps the most striking feature of the Rehnquist 
Court's jurisprudence has been the revival over the last 5-10 years of doctrines of constitutional 
federalism . . . .  Not since before the New Deal-era constitutional revolution of 1937 have the 
states received such protection in the U.S. Supreme Court from allegedly burdensome federal 
statutes."). 
223 . Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 ( 1997). 
224. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (declaring 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1 3981 unconstitutional). 
225. See United States v. Lopez, 5 14  U.S. 549, 552 ( 1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990 as exceeding the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause). 
226. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 ("The Federal Government may neither issue directives 
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers to 
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program."). 
227. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) ("[l]n 
practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, 
to a significant degree, will satisfy due process."); BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 5 1 7  U.S. 559, 
575 ( 1 996) (striking down a punitive damages award of$2 million as "grossly excessive"). 
228. See Bush v. Gore, 531  U.S. 98, 1 1 1  (2000) ("Seven Justices of the Court agree that 
there are constitutional problems with the jurisdiction recount ordered by the Florida Supreme 
Court that demand a remedy."). 
229. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000) (holding that a safety 
standard promulgated under the authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 
of 1966 preempts a state common law action). 
230. See Beneficial Nat'! Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 ,  1 1  (2003) ("Because §§ 85 and 86 
provide the exclusive cause of action for such claims, there is, in short, no such thing as a state­
law claim of usury against a national bank."). 
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preemption, and supplied expansive interpretations of federal jurisdictional 
statutes. 23 1  
What is going on here? How is it  that the advocates of devolution, states'  
rights, dual sovereignty, and federalism are the progenitors of so much anti­
federalist procedure? Apparently, most of those officials responsible for the 
schizophrenic policies just described are fair-weather federalists. That is, their 
belief in federalism is insufficiently principled to withstand the unfavorable 
outcomes that sometimes result when states make their own decisions. 232 Rep . 
Christopher Shays of Connecticut, one of five House Republicans who voted 
against Terri's Law, appeared to agree with this assessment when he stated, 
"My party is demonstrating that they are for states' rights unless they don't like 
what states are doing. . . . This couldn't be a more classic case of a state 
responsibility. "233 Under the notion of fair-weather federalism, then, when state 
courts permit overly large punitive damages awards or too many frivolous 
lawsuits, states' rights must take a back seat to federal tort reform. 
If these strong advocates of states' rights are yielding federalism principles 
on occasion, what principles are being favored in their stead? In the case of 
Terri Schiavo, for some a sincere belief in the need to protect a "culture oflife" 
231. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 320 
(2005) ( confirming federal court over state law quiet title claims if they present a contested 
federal issue); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2625 (2005) 
(allowing supplemental jurisdiction in diversity actions over plaintiffs who fail to meet the 
amount-in-controversy requirement, as long as other diversity requirements are met and at least 
one plaintiff satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement). 
232. See, e.g., Jerome Ringler, The Unfairness of the Class Action Fairness Act, 29 L.A. 
LA WYER 52, 52 (March 2006) ("[The Class Action Fairness Act] destroys a sacrosanct principle 
among conservatives--federalism . . . . [I]t is hypocritical to brandish the Constitution and 
publicly recite the Tenth Amendment while simultaneously erasing important rights among the 
individual states."). This hypocrisy also manifests itself outside of matters of process; fair­
weather federalists have sought to impose their substantive policy preferences on states in 
various areas such as education and same-sex marriage. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (imposing national requirements intended to 
close the achievement gap by providing accountability, flexibility, and choice); Remarks of 
Pres. George W. Bush Calling for a Constitutional Amendment Defining and Protecting 
Marriage, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 276 (Feb. 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html ("Today I call upon the 
Congress to promptly pass and send to the Senate for ratification an amendment to our 
Constitution defining and protecting marriage as a union of man and woman as husband and 
wife."). 
233. Adam Nagourney, G.O.P. Right Is Splintered on Schiavo Intervention, N.Y. nMES, 
Mar. 23, 2005, at A l  4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/23/politics/23repubs. 
html?ei=5088&en=3 70f7363 l 5233 581 &ex= l 269234000&partner=rssnyt&pagewanted=print 
&position=. 
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motivated their actions;234 for others, it is probably safe to surmise that politics 
had something to do with it. In the area offederal tort reform, the nature of the 
policies embodied in the legislation seems to indicate that federalism is yielding 
to a desire to protect corporate defendants against certain kinds of suits. The 
legislation seeking to limit punitive damages, the PSLRA and SLUSA, the 
Class Action Fairness Act, and the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act all interfere 
with state judicial authority in categories of cases where corporate defendants 
face potentially large liability and have sought to make it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to initiate and prevail in such cases. 235 The aim and effect of these 
bills and enactments uniformly has been to alter state legal rules in ways that 
favor such defendants rather than the parties seeking relief. 
What explains the Supreme Court's moments of anti-federalism in the 
midst of its federalism renaissance? In Bush v. Gore many have speculated that 
raw politics motivated the Justices, given what was at stake in the case.236 It is 
not far fetched to suppose that the outcome their decision would bring about-a 
Republican presidential victory-was squarely in mind when the five 
"conservative" Justices decided the case as they did.237 More certain is the fact 
that the Court's due process remittitur jurisprudence is motivated by a distaste 
for the outcomes produced by state courts awarding punitive damages. In cases 
leading up to BMW of North America v. Gore, Justice O'Connor remarked that 
" [ a ]wards of punitive damages are skyrocketing, "238 while Justice Blackmun 
expressed concern about "punitive damages that 'run wild. "'239 Further, as with 
234. See id. ("[S]ome conservatives . . .  argued that their opposition to euthanasia as part of 
their support of the right-to-life movement trumped any aversion they might have to a dominant 
federal government."). 
235. See, e.g., Ringler, supra note 232, at 52 ("What these elected officials-Democrats 
and Republicans alike-really object to is that too many class action lawsuits are successful. It 
should come as no surprise that principal supporters of CAFA are large corporations (and 
political contributors) that find themselves accused of wrongdoing."). 
236. For example, David Strauss has stated: 
The conclusion that emerges, in my view, is that several members of the Court­
perhaps a majority-were determined to overturn any ruling of the Florida Supreme 
Court that was favorable to Vice President Gore, at least if that ruling significantly 
enhanced the Vice President's chances of winning the election. 
Strauss, supra note 140, at 737-38. 
237. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REv. 1045, 1063 (2001)  ("Bush v. Gore seems to involve 'low politics'­
with the five conservatives adopting whatever arguments were necessary to ensure the election 
of the Republican candidate, George W. Bush."). 
238. Browning-Ferris Indus. ofVt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
239. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I ,  1 8  ( 1991). 
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congressional tort reform efforts, the Court's excessiveness jurisprudence 
benefits corporate defendants, whether by chance or by design. 
Explaining the Court's anti-federalism with respect to preemption 
doctrines and federal jurisdiction is more difficult. The federalist tendencies of 
the Court have revealed themselves primarily in the context of limiting 
Congress's ability to impose its will on the states, leading many to conclude 
that the Court was vigorously protective of states' rights. However, the Court 
has not been solicitous of states' rights when it comes to interpreting the scope 
of federal jurisdiction or federal preemption. Is there an inconsistency here? 
Yes, if the Court's effort to constrain congressional authority is viewed through 
the prism of states' rights. However, as it turns out, the Court's invalidation of 
Congressional action has not been so much a result of the Court's desire to 
protect states as it has been an effort aimed at diminishing the power of 
Congress to exercise plenary regulatory authority. 240 The Court's overly broad 
views of federal jurisdiction and preemption have revealed a Court protective 
of its own power or that of the federal courts in general vis-a-vis the states. 
Thus, the two jurisprudential strains can both be seen as variants of the same 
phenomenon: the Court's ascription of more power to itself and pursuit of 
judicial supremacy.241 As one commentator stated it, "There is a Rehnquist 
Court revolution in progress, and it is definitely not . . . a states' rights 
revolution . . . . Rather, it is a separation of powers revolution that has to do 
with the primacy of the judicial branch and of the Court itself. "242 Of course, 
240. See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 1 00 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83 
(2001 )  ("In acting repeatedly to invalidate federal legislation, the Court is using its authority to 
diminish the proper role of Congress."); see also Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: 
The Supreme Court 's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 367, 371 
(2002). Sylvia Law notes that: 
[T]he Supreme Court has diminished the power of Congress to address national 
problems in ways that we have not seen since the Taft Court Era and the 
constitutionally disastrous period when the Court denied the New Deal Congress 
and president the power to adopt federal responses to the Great Depression. 
241.  See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Thinking about the Supreme Court after Bush v. Gore, 
35 IND. L. REv. 435, 43fr37 (2002). As Linda Greenhouse points out: 
People who think that what has motivated the Rehnquist Court in such cases as 
United States v. Lopez, City of Boerne v. Flores, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, Alden v. Maine, Kimel v. 
Florida Board of Regents, and just last month, Board a/Trustees of the University 
of Alabama v. Garrett is states' rights are looking through the wrong end of the 
constitutional telescope. The game that is really afoot is judicial supremacy . . . .  
Id. (citations omitted). 
242. Id. at 438. 
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although judicial supremacy may be the practical result of the Court's 
decisions, it is not possible to ascribe to the Court with any determinacy the 
motive to achieve this end. 
Nevertheless, a federalism-respecting approach to federal jurisdiction and 
preemption demands that the Court restrain itself from self-aggrandizing 
interpretations of congressional enactments when doing so interferes with the 
traditionally recognized authority of state judiciaries to hear and manage state 
law claims in their courts. The Court's rejection of congressional overreaching 
under the Commerce Clause has largely been proper because the rejected 
statutes were not properly aimed at regulating interstate commerce. However, 
the Court's own inventions of implied and complete preemption and expansive 
notions of arising under jurisdiction are no more legitimate from a 
constitutional perspective, as has been shown above. Thus, the larger 
inconsistency here is that the Court reprimands Congress for unsupported 
forays into the regulation of states but itself indulges in the same. 
IV. Towards Federalist Procedure 
What would federalism-respecting procedure look like, specifically, in the 
areas discussed above? Federalist procedure, in general, would take seriously 
the limits imposed on federal authority-as exercised by all three branches­
vis-a-vis the states by treading lightly in instances where traditional state 
judicial authority might be imposed upon and declining to offend state judicial 
prerogatives through implication. Such an approach would require the 
wholesale repudiation of several doctrines and congressional enactments, but 
would result in a legal landscape more in line with the principles of federalism 
enshrined in the Constitution. 
A .  Limited Preemption 
Justice Thomas perceives that the Court has an "increasing reluctance to 
expand federal statutes beyond their terms through doctrines of implied pre­
emption" in light of the belief that "pre-emption analysis is not ' [a] 
freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with 
federal objectives. "'243 If indeed there is such a growing reluctance, that would 
243. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Gade v. Nat'! Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 
111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
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be a promising move in the right direction. However, if the Court was 
interested in fully embracing federalist procedure, it would need to reshape 
preemption doctrine in the following manner. 
1 .  Abolition of Implied Preemption 
In order to respect principles offederalism and the sovereign authority of 
states, the starting point for analyzing the preemptive effect of any federal law 
that operates "in a field which the States have traditionally occupied"244 should 
be a presumption against preemption. As Justice Stevens has explained: 
Our presumption against pre-emption is rooted in the concept offederalism. 
It recognizes that when Congress legislates " in a field which the States have 
traditionally occupied . . .  [,] we start with the assumption that the historic 
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. "245 
To depart from this presumption, then, the Court should require that the federal 
law at issue contain a clear expression of congressional intent to preempt state 
law.246 
a. Express Preemption Requirement 
Given the weighty concerns underlying this presumption, courts should 
only find the presence of a congressional intent to preempt state law when the 
relevant federal statute contains an express preemption clause. Because states 
are sovereigns within our federal system that retain the power to legislate and 
adjudicate with respect to matters within their traditional sphere of authority, 247 
244. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
245. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230). 
246. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated: 
Because of the role of States as separate sovereigns in our federal system, we have 
long presumed that state laws-particularly those, such as the provision of tort 
remedies to compensate for personal injuries, that are within the scope of the 
States' historic police powers-are not to be pre-empted by a federal statute unless 
it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to do so. 
Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) and Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes 
Mgmt Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 116-117 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting)). 
247. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court stated: 
[T]he Constitution of the United States . . .  recognizes and preserves the autonomy 
and independence of the States-independence in their legislative and 
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the preemption of state law is a serious result that only congressional action can 
achieve. Congress, not the courts, has the power of preemption; it is only for 
the courts to enforce preemption in those circumstances where Congress has 
imposed it. Congress clearly knows how to do this expressly and 
unambiguously, given the innumerable occasions on which it has done so. 
Certainly, then, federal statutes that fail to provide expressly for the preemption 
of state law should not be read to do so anyway. Such a practice-which fairly 
describes the Court's current doctrine of implied preemption-makes the courts 
rather than Congress the progenitors of preemption, a role courts have no 
authority to play. 
b. Scope of Preemption Limited to Terms of Express Provision 
Further, when Congress includes an express preemption clause in a 
statute, courts should confine the preemptive effect of the statute on state law to 
those instances covered by the express provision. By specifically delineating 
the domain expressly preempted by the statute, Congress should be viewed as 
having intended to limit the scope of preemption to that domain. As the 
Supreme Court explained in a now emasculated opinion that suggested support 
for such a rule, 
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included 
in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and 
when that provision provides a "reliable indicium of congressional intent 
with respect to state authority, there is no need to infer congressional intent 
to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions" of the legislation. 
Such reasoning is a variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius: Congress' enactment of a provision defining the pre­
emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not 
pre-empted. 248 
The Court inexplicably backpeddled from this position in Freightliner 
Corp. v. Myric/<49 by writing, "The fact that an express definition of the pre-
independence in their judicial departments. Supervision over either the legislative 
or the judicial action of the States is in no case pennissible except as to matters by 
the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any 
interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of 
the State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence. 
Id. at 78-79. 
248. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (citations omitted). 
249. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995) (holding that the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act did not expressly or implicitly preempt state common law 
design defect claims). 
284 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233 (2007) 
emptive reach of a statute 'implies' -i.e., supports a reasonable inference-that 
Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the 
express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption. "250 
This position must be abandoned. Again, Congress alone holds the power of 
preemption. By exercising that power in a definitive and unambiguous fashion 
through an express preemption provision, there is no room for courts to say that 
Congress intended to say more and preempt more but for some reason was 
reticent. Such a maneuver is nothing more than judicially-created preemption 
that illegitimately impinges on states' legitimate sphere of authority. 
c. Savings Clauses as a Bar to Implied Preemption 
Worse still is the circumstance in which courts imply preemption 
notwithstanding the presence of a savings clause expressly declaring that 
certain state laws or legal actions are not preempted. Savings clauses, which 
spell out the extent to which a congressional enactment does not preempt state 
law, should serve as an absolute bar to field and obstacle preemption. 
Nevertheless, the Court has determined that a savings clause only "saves" state 
legal rules or remedies from the scope of any express preemption clause, not 
from the reach of any implied preemption that courts may discern.251 
Federalism-respecting procedure would reject this reasoning and treat savings 
clauses as foreclosing any recourse to implied preemption. Of course, 
adherence to the previous two rules-no preemption in the absence of an 
express preemption provision and preemption limited in scope to the terms of 
the express provision-already eliminate implied preemption in toto, rendering 
savings clauses not much more than a belt-and-suspenders approach. 
It should be noted that none of these rules preclude a finding of 
preemption in cases where it is impossible to comply both with federal and state 
law. Even where Congress neglects to insert an express preemption clause in a 
federal statute, when federal and state law collide to such an extent that the 
compliance with one necessitates the violation of the other, the federal law 
trumps or preempts the conflicting state law purely by direct application of the 
Suprema-;y Clause. Article VI, clause 2 provides, "This Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . .  shall 
250. Id. at 288. 
251. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) ("We have just said 
that the saving clause at least removes tort actions from the scope of the express pre-emption 
clause . . . .  We now conclude that the saving clause (like the express preemption provision) does 
not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles."). 
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be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. "252 Thus, Congress, when validly legislating pursuant to its 
constitutional authority, need not expressly declare any intention that its law 
preempt any contrary state law with which simultaneous compliance would be 
impossible; the Supremacy Clause of its own force declares that result. The 
preemption that results is in no sense "implied" as the Supreme Court has 
stated;253 quite to the contrary, such preemption is the most basic and express 
form of preemption that exists because the express terms of the Supremacy 
Clause ("any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding") call for it. 
In sum, a preemption doctrine that respects federalism principles should 
abandon implied preemption-specifically "obstacle" and "field" preemption­
and confine itself to instances of express preemption and situations where it is 
impossible to comply both with federal and state law.254 
2. Narrow Construction 
When reading federal statutes to determine their preemptive effect, courts 
should construe those statutes narrowly-consistent with their stated purpose-­
in order to avoid unnecessary and improper preemption of state law. The 
Supreme Court provided a good example of this practice recently in Bates v. 
Dow Agrosciences255 where it faced the question of whether state law damages 
claims against the sellers of a certain pesticide were preempted by the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).256 Specifically, because 
FIFRA provided that states "shall not impose or continue in effect any 
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those 
required under this subchapter" the question was whether successful state tort 
252. U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2. 
253. See Freightliner Corp., 5 1 4  U.S. at 287 ("We have found implied conflict pre­
emption where it is 'impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal 
requirements."') (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)). 
254. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, 
33 PEPP. L. REv. 69, 74-75 (2005) ("I think there should be only two situations when there is 
preemption of state law. One is express preemption. The other is when federal law and state 
law are mutually exclusive, so it is not possible for somebody to comply with both."). 
255. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 43 1 (2005). 
256. Id. at 434. 
286 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233 (2007) 
claims would create a state common law labeling requirement in contravention 
of this provision in the Act. 257 
Rather than reading the preemption clause of FIFRA broadly to prohibit 
any state judicial action that would influence sellers to alter their labeling, the 
Court held that only state legal rules that required manufacturers to label or 
package their products in a particular way would be preempted by FIFRA. 258 
Finding that "[r]ules that require manufacturers to design reasonably safe 
products, to use due care in conducting appropriate testing of their products, to 
market products free of manufacturing defects, and to honor their express 
warranties or other contractual commitments plainly do not qualify as 
requirements for ' labeling or packaging,"' the Court concluded that 
"petitioners' claims for defective design, defective manufacture, negligent 
testing, and breach of express warranty are not pre-empted. "259 In rejecting the 
lower court's "effects-based test" that sought to bring labeling-influencing state 
court judgments within the ambit of FIFRA' s preemption provision, the Court 
properly confined the statute to the reading that respected state sovereign 
authority by not requiring the preemption of many important state law claims. 
Another example of narrow construction can be found in Geier v. 
American Honda Motor Co. , a case this Article has already discussed.260 The 
express preemption provision of the statute at issue in Geier, the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act), provides: 
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either 
to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or 
item of motor vehicle equipment[,] any safety standard applicable to the 
same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is 
not identical to the Federal standard.261 
The question for the Court was whether the use of the term "standard" rather 
than "requirement" in the statute meant that the preemption provision failed to 
embrace tort actions since the Court had previously held that the word 
"requirement" included such actions. Although the Court felt that "it is 
possible to read the pre-emption provision, standing alone, as applying to 
standards imposed in common-law tort actions," the Court concluded that such 
a "broad reading" would render the Safety Act's savings clause-which 
preserves potential "liability at common law" notwithstanding compliance with 
257. Id. at 436. 
258. Id. at 444. 
259. Id. 
260. See supra Part II.A ( discussing Geier in an implied preemption context). 
261 .  1 5  U.S.C. § l 392(d) (1988) (repealed 1994) (emphasis added). 
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the Safety Act-meaningless. 262 In opting for the "narrow reading that 
excludes common-law actions," the Court again comported itself in a 
manner consistent with principles of federalist procedure.263 
B. The Proper Regulation of Interstate Commerce 
Moving definitively towards federalist procedure requires a substantial 
paring back of Congress's  ability to regulate state courts under the 
Commerce Clause. Two main pronouncements from the Supreme Court 
would achieve this end: ( 1 )  a prohibition against regulating state court 
jurisdiction and procedure via the Commerce Clause or (2) the wholesale 
adoption of a strict prohibition against regulating non-economic activity 
thought to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce in the name of 
the Commerce Clause. 
The error of regulating state court efforts to adjudicate commercial 
disputes has already been made clear.264 Such adjudication constitutes non­
economic activity but more importantly consists of the exercise, by states, 
of their sovereign authority to resolve disputes arising under their own 
laws. While the substantial effects test itself is of questionable validity,265 
its invocation to uphold direct congressional regulation of state court 
jurisdiction and procedure should never be countenanced given the 
resultant subversion of basic principles of dual sovereignty and 
federalism.266 Because the latter of the two proposals-the wholesale 
abandonment of the substantial effects test in the context of non-economic 
activity-would affect Congress's  power not only respecting anti-federalist 
procedure but also all non-economic activity, opting for the former 
proposal would be the more cautious approach. 
262. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 ( "On that broad reading of the pre-emption clause little, if any, 
potential 'liability at common law' would remain. And few, if any, state tort actions would 
remain for the saving clause to save. "). 
263. Id. 
264. See supra Part II.A (discussing the impropriety and overreaching of the Court's 
finding of implied preemption in Geier). 
265. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. I ,  67 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ( "[T]he 
'substantial effects' test is a 'rootless and malleable standard' at odds with the constitutional 
design.") (quoting U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 ( 1999) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
266. Cf id. at 65 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ( " Congress may not use its incidental authority to 
subvert basic principles of federalism and dual sovereignty."). 
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C. Narrowly Construed Federal Jurisdiction 
To place the scope of federal jurisdiction back within its proper 
confines, the Supreme Court will have to take two radical steps: (1) adopt 
Justice Holmes's "Creation Test" for determining the presence of federal 
question jurisdiction and (2) abolish the complete preemption doctrine. 
Further, to undo the substantial expansion offederaljurisdiction worked by the 
Court' s  correct interpretation of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, Congress 
must amend the statute to clarify its apparent original intent that claims by 
parties joined under Rule 23 not receive the benefit of supplemental jurisdiction 
in diversity cases. 
1 .  Adoption of Holmes 's "Creation Test" 
The court's current view of arising under jurisdiction pursuant to the 
federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is that it confers federal 
jurisdiction both over claims created by federal law and state law claims that 
implicate substantial federal issues. 267 Virtually all complexity in this body of 
law derives from the latter portion of this statement. That is, the Court's federal 
question cases have almost uniformly concerned themselves with determining 
the circumstances under which state law claims may nonetheless be deemed to 
arise under federal law. 268 Given the sovereign authority of states to adjudicate 
claims created by their respective laws and the traditional understanding that 
state courts are competent to resolve federal issues, broadly interpreting federal 
267. Grable & Sons Metal Prods. Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312  (2005). 
268. See, e.g. , Merrell Dow Phann. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817  ( 1986) (holding 
that a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action 
does not state a claim arising under federal law when Congress has determined that there should 
be no private federal cause of action); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation 
Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. l ,  28 ( 1983) (holding that a suit by state tax authorities to enforce its 
levies against funds held in a trust pursuant to an ERISA-covered employee benefit plan is 
neither a creature of ERISA itselfnor a suit which turns on a question of federal law); Gully v. 
First Nat'! Bank, 299 U.S. 1 09, 1 12 ( 1936) ("To bring a case within [a federal] statute, a right or 
immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an 
essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action."); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 
180, 1 99 ( 192 1 )  (holding that an ultra vires claim under state law against a corporation that 
invested funds in the bonds of Congressionally created banks, on grounds that the 
Congressional creation acts themselves were unconstitutional, states a claim that arises under 
federal law); Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 490-91 ( 19 17) (providing federal jurisdiction 
over a state quiet title action that involved the construction and effect of U.S. mining laws); 
Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 56 1 ,  569 ( 19 12) (finding that a suit involving rights to land 
acquired under a law of the United States does not necessarily raise a federal question). 
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arising under jurisdiction to include state law claims is both unnecessary and 
offensive to state sovereignty. The Court has noted in the past that respect for 
state sovereignty must factor into determinations of the scope of federal 
question jurisdiction: "We have consistently emphasized that, in exploring the 
outer reaches of § 1 33 1 ,  determinations about federal jurisdiction require 
sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal 
system."269 Unfortunately, the Court's own view of arising under jurisdiction 
in Grable & Sons gives too little regard to federalist concerns. 
A federalism-respecting approach to federal question jurisdiction demands 
the adoption of the so-called "creation test" originally propounded by Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Under the creation test, "A suit arises under the law 
that creates the cause of action. ,,21o That means that § 1 3  3 1  jurisdiction would 
be confined to "cases in which federal law creates the cause of action pleaded 
on the face of the plaintiff's complaint."27 1 In addition to having the benefit of 
clarity and simplicity,272 the creation test conforms with the meaning one must 
ascribe to the "arising under" language of the statute iffederalism concerns are 
to be honored. That is, not only is it strained to say that a case arising under 
state law nonetheless arises under federal law because of the presence of an 
embedded substantial federal issue, but it is a strained interpretation used to 
encroach upon cases that unquestionably fall within the jurisdiction of state 
courts. Certainly, sensitivity to the federal system demands that the Court opt 
for the more natural and less offensive interpretation of§ 1 33 1  until Congress 
gives some clear indication of its intent to the contrary. 
One should be clear that confining federal question jurisdiction in the 
manner herein proposed does not mean the relinquishment of federal control over 
vast instances of critical matters offederal law. The Supreme Court would retain 
the ability to review state decisions on federal issues through its certiorari 
jurisdiction.273 However, were the Court disinclined to move in this direction-
269. Merrell Dow Phann. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 8 1 0  ( 1 986). 
270. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 ( 1 9 1 6). 
27 1 .  Grable & Sons Metal Prods. Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 320 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
272. The clarity of the creation test is the principal attribute that commends adoption of the 
rule to Justice Thomas: 
Whatever the vices of the American Well Works rule, it is clear. Moreover, it 
accounts for the vast majority of cases that come within § 1 3 3 1  under our current 
case law-further indication that trying to sort out which cases fall within the 
smaller Smith category may not be worth the effort it entails. 
Id. at 32 1 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
273. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 8 1 6  ("[E]ven ifthere is no original district court jurisdiction 
for these kinds of action, this Court retains power to review the decision of a federal issue in a 
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which is likely to be the case given the unanimity of the Grable decision (Justice 
Thomas' nod in this direction notwithstanding)--Congress could achieve this 
result legislatively by amending § 1331 as follows: "The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions in which the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States create the claims asserted therein." The virtue of 
this route would be the certainty provided by clear words from Congress and 
the elimination of any need to rely on the Court's potentially changeable 
interpretation of § 1331 's existing language. 
2. A bolition of the Complete Preemption Doctrine 
The doctrine of complete preemption should be abolished to the extent 
that the Court infers its existence in any given case. Congress of course retains 
the authority to provide expressly for the removability of preempted state law 
claims, as it has done in the past,274 and the Court would be obliged to enforce 
such a provision. Further, state law claims preempted by statutes where 
Congress adopted the language approved in Avco Corp. v. International 
A ssociation of Machinist and A erospace Workers275 as indicative of an intent to 
permit complete preemption removal should continue to be removable not by 
operation of the complete preemption doctrine but rather to honor the clear 
expression of congressional intent that such be the case. 276 This is what 
occurred in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,277 where the Court held that 
complete preemption supported the removal of state common law causes of 
action asserting improper processing of benefit claims under a plan regulated 
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).278 They did so 
because ERISA's "jurisdiction subsection, § 502(f), used language similar to 
the statutory language construed in Avco, thereby indicating that the two 
statutes should be construed in the same way" and "the legislative history of 
ERISA unambiguously described an intent to treat such actions 'as arising 
state cause of action." (citing Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U. S. 205, 2 14- 15  
(1934))). 
274. See, e.g. , El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U. S. 473, 484-85 ( 1999) 
(discussing the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2014(hh)). 
274. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing A vco). 
276. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U. S. 1 ,  2 1-22 ( Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I 
would adhere to the approach taken by Taylor and on the basis of stare decisis simply affirm, 
without any real explanation, that the LMRA and statutes modeled after it have a 'unique pre­
emptive force' that (quite illogically) suspends the normal rules of removal jurisdiction."). 
277. Metro. Life Ins. Co., v Taylor, 48 1 U. S. 58 ( 1987). 
278. Id. at 64-66. 
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under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under 
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.'"279 
3. Legislative Overro/ing of Allapattah Services 
As already noted, the Court was correct in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Services Inc. to interpret the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1367, to allow supplemental jurisdiction over jurisdictionally 
insufficient claims asserted by parties in diversity actions joined under Rules 20 
or 23.280 However, given the broad implications of such an interpretation-that 
only named plaintiffs in class actions will have to satisfy the amount in 
controversy requirement-Congress should amend the statute to reinstate the 
holding of Zahn v. International Paper Co. 281 Specifically, an amended 
§ 1367(b) would read as follows (with inserted language italicized): 
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction 
founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have 
supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs 
against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined 
as plaintiffs under Rule 19  of such rules,joined as plaintiffs under Rule 20 
of such rules, proceeding as members of a class under Rule 23 of such 
rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, 
when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be 
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332. 
Making this change would prevent litigants from circumventing the 
ordinary requirement of the diversity statute, as interpreted by Zahn, that 
jurisdiction is proper only over those claims "where the matter in controversy 
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000" and that insufficient claims of multiple 
plaintiffs may not piggyback on a claim that has satisfied the required 
amount. 282 Under the current version of§ l 367(b) as interpreted by the Court, 
the named class representative could assert a claim for $75,001 and remaining 
class members could each assert negligible claims for $1 each. Diversity 
279. Beneficial Nat '/ Bank, 539 U.S. at 7-8 (quoting Metro. life, 48 1 U.S. at 65---06). 
280. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 1 25 S. Ct. 261 1 ,  2621 (2005) ("The 
natural, indeed the necessary, inference is that § 1 367 confers supplemental jurisdiction over 
claims by . . .  Rule 23 plaintiffs."). 
28 1 .  See Zahn v. Int'! Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 , 300 ( 1973) (holding that in the context ofa 
class action invoking diversity jurisdiction, every plaintiff must separately satisfy the amount-in­
controversy requirement of the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1 332). 
282. Id. at 301 .  
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jurisdiction has not been made available for those claims and supplemental 
jurisdiction has been extended to them apparently only accidentally. Clearly, 
with Congress's passage of the Class Action Fairness Act, it indicated the 
degree to which it wished to permit the aggregation of class action claims in 
order to enjoy federal jurisdiction. It makes no sense then for Congress to leave 
§ 1367(b) in its current state because it allows class actions that aggregate to 
less than $5 million (the CAFA amount)283 into the federal courthouse, 
notwithstanding CAFA's $5 million requirement. 
D. General Principles 
Beyond these specific reforms, it is worth sketching out several general 
principles of federalist procedure that should guide Congress and the federal 
courts in enacting and interpreting laws in ways that respect principles of 
federalism and state sovereign authority: 
First, under no circumstances should Congress be permitted to prescribe 
procedure to be applied within state courts adjudicating state law claims. If 
Congress wants certain types of claims to be handled in a particular fashion, it 
must legislate in the area and expressly preempt state law, so that such cases 
can be treated as federal claims triable in the federal courts where Congress can 
directly control procedure if it wishes. 
Second, all doubts or ambiguities regarding federal jurisdictional statutes 
should be resolved against jurisdiction where a contrary interpretation would 
interfere with the ability of state courts to hear and adjudicate state law claims 
traditionally within their sphere of authority. In effect, there should be a strong 
presumption against federal jurisdiction over state law claims unless Congress 
has made plain its intent to the contrary. The jurisdiction of the federal courts 
should not be expanded through judicial implication when state law claims are 
at issue. Indeed, in our system of constitutional federalism, it may even be 
appropriate to consider embracing a canon of statutory construction that obliges 
courts to read statutes with an eye towards respecting state sovereign authority 
and the notion of reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment. 
Third, Congress must stop playing politics with procedure. Procedural 
rules in the civil context must be motivated by establishing, ex ante, a fair and 
efficient process for resolving disputes, not with an eye towards facilitating a 
particular outcome. More often than not, anti-federalist procedure has been the 
product of thinly-veiled efforts to manipulate process in a manner that will yield 
283. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing CAFA provisions). 
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or facilitate a desired substantive outcome: lower and fewer punitive damages 
awards, fewer certified class actions, fewer securities fraud lawsuits, a ruling to 
reinsert life support for Terri Schiavo, and a Republican victory in a 
Presidential election . The sovereign authority of states to control their 
judiciaries and to adjudicate state law claims are rights preserved by the Tenth 
Amendment that should not cavalierly be trampled upon for the sake of mean 
political ends. 
V. Conclusion 
Constitutional federalism is an important value that deserves to be upheld 
consistently by Congress and the Supreme Court. Though a preponderance of 
the members of both of these branches of government are self-professed 
federalists, some of them have too often indulged in anti-federalist policies and 
doctrines when the authority of state courts hung in the balance. No longer can 
such lapses be tolerated .  The reforms proposed above go a good way towards 
bringing respect for constitutional federalism into relations between the federal 
government and state judiciaries. Hopefully, policy leaders and members of the 
Supreme Court who espouse a belief in limited federal government and a 
respect for state sovereign authority will have the courage of their convictions 
to move in this direction notwithstanding the substantive policy consequences 
that may result. If principle can prevail over politics, our national government 
can be pushed back within the confines of the limited authority the Founders 
envisioned. 
